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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores the doctrinal divide among homeland defense (HD), 
homeland security (HS), and defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) and questions 
whether these doctrinal spaces are adequately instructive to National Guard domestic 
action. The thesis explores the Department of Defense’s (DoD) important contributions to 
HD and DSCA and the Guard’s historical and contemporary roles in HD and HS. This 
work proposes that the DoD’s reticence to describe its actions as HS creates a doctrinal 
void for the Guard. This thesis advances DSCA as theoretically and practically useful for 
the DoD but concurrently contravenes core principles of domestic response, which is 
practically inadequate for domestic Guard action. By exploring military action in 
large-scale, complex disasters and national special security events, this thesis provides 
insight into the legal, policy, and fiscal challenges and solutions for clearer domestic 
doctrine. The thesis explores whether the Guard can be better employed in disasters by 
adjudicating matters of defense over security and engaging in a federalism conversation 
aimed at discriminating between disasters that are “national matters” and those that are 
“state matters.” 
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The country’s active, reserve, and National Guard forces . . . must continue 
to enhance their ability to provide support to civil authorities, not only to 
help prevent terrorism but also to respond to and recover from man-made 
and natural disasters that do occur. 
 —Homeland Security Council1 
 
U.S. strategic guidance to the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National 
Guard presses both organizations to assume important supporting roles in the homeland. 
To this end, the DoD propagates doctrine that describes three distinct domestic missions: 
homeland security (HS), homeland defense (HD), and defense support to civil authorities 
(DSCA).2 The DoD’s doctrine relating to civil support clarifies that these “are distinct 
operations.”3 However, these doctrinal distinctions are primarily designed to inform DoD 
action in the homeland, particularly DSCA, and National Guard action in narrowly 
impractical federal missions. If the DoD and the Guard are to provide effective support to 
civil authorities, then doctrine will need to be improved to provide for National Guard 
action across a more diverse continuum of domestic action.  
The National Guards are able to serve at the extremes of—and in the space 
between—purely federal and purely state action. Their dual nature complicates discrete 
treatment within the DoD’s doctrinal framework. DoD guidance describes the action of 
National Guards in the homeland in support of their governors and of DoD action via 
integration into domestic operations. The guidance does not adequately explain how the 
National Guard operates in the space between, apart from, or in cooperation with DoD 
action. This research examines the doctrinal and directive space between purely federal 
                                                 
1 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington DC: Homeland 
Security Council, October 2007), 51, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_ 
2007.pdf. 
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Joint Publication 3-28 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2013), I-2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_28.pdf? 
ver=2018-11-29-083820-613. 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-4. 
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National Guard action in support of the DoD and purely state action accomplishing state 
matters.  
National Guards operate within their states under the governors’ direction, can be 
activated in state active duty, and in this capacity, are funded from the state’s budget. The 
DoD operates at the request of lead federal agencies supporting states’ requests for 
assistance, and DoD forces are employed in accordance with DSCA regulations—from the 
federal budget. However, when National Guard forces from an unaffected state are 
employed in support of an affected state, the authorities, funding solutions, and federal and 
state demarcation become less clear. Hurricane response actions in 2017 demonstrate that 
senior emergency managers from the DoD and the National Guard are ill-equipped to 
adjudicate these doctrinal lines. The adjudication debate rested on a central question: Were 
the disasters a national concern and, therefore, a federal responsibility, or were the 
responses independent state matters? This then-unanswered question has implications for 
what doctrinal space National Guard forces should occupy. 
Admittedly, it is the Guard’s ability to operate as either a federal or a state entity 
that makes this doctrine so difficult to define. DoD guidance is justifiably written to serve 
its own purpose and to describe how it operates in the domestic environment. References 
to the Guard, therefore, naturally focus on its integration into DoD activities rather than 
operations distinct from DoD activities. DoD guidance describes how the Guard integrates 
into DoD operations but fails to consider that the DoD normally integrates into operations 
in which the Guard has primacy—in support of state-led response and recovery. National 
Guard units are the primary military responders in domestic operations and emergencies.4 
Nevertheless, DoD doctrine and directives remain largely silent in recognizing the Guard’s 
obvious leadership role in military homeland security roles. 
Doctrinarians looking to discriminate between domestic mission spaces should 
look to precedent within homeland defense; large-scale, complex disasters; and national 
special security events (NSSEs). These situations serve to clarify the domestic actions of 
                                                 
4 Ted Martin and Corey Thomas, eds., Domestic Operational Law: 2018 Handbook for Judge 
Advocates (Charlottesville, VA: Center for Law and Military Operations, 2018), 3. 
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the DoD and the Guard and hint toward ways to improve existing military doctrine. HD 
missions are well described in domestic doctrine, and legislation, policy, and guidance all 
provide clear instruction for how the Guard should integrate into these activities. HD is 
well defined because its doctrine lays upon unambiguous legislation and policy derived 
from relatively recent modifications to Title 32 of the U.S. Code (U.S.C.). Similar clarity 
in Title 10 and Title 32 provide equally useful insight for National Guard counter-drug 
units and weapons of mass destruction–civil support teams. These federally funded, state-
controlled teams regularly accomplish nationally significant HD and HS missions.  
When Guard personnel responded to Hurricane Katrina, they did so through 
bottom-up engagement in keeping with the National Response Framework and under the 
authority and direction of their governors. At the same time, a state-to-federal conversation 
immediately sought to determine whether the emergency was a national or state concern. 
This federalism debate led to presidential disaster declarations that opened the doors to 
assistance from federal agencies including the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
and the DoD. Additionally, the assistant secretary of defense agreed to federally fund the 
state-controlled National Guard response as it accomplished homeland security missions. 
While the Katrina response is a good model for debating federalism and funding, the DoD 
immediately worked to ensure the results of this particular debate did not establish 
precedent. The changes it made to DSCA regulations aimed to clarify that the DoD could 
not afford to fund Guard disaster response and that DSCA would no longer be approved 
based on a governor’s request. The DoD’s current doctrine is built on the premise that 
missions like these are not authorized by law. From a financial perspective, the 2017 
hurricane season was more devastating than the 2005 season that saw Katrina. A major 
earthquake associated with the New Madrid Seismic Zone would vastly eclipse either of 
these events, and effective response would hinge on proper Guard employment. Clearly, 
some policy action is required to bridge the practical reality that federally funded, state-
controlled Guard personnel are critical enablers in large-scale, complex disasters with the 
legal reality of fiscal restrictions imposed on the DoD.  
NSSEs point toward an established mode of adjudicating matters of scale, 
federalism, jurisdiction, and funding. When events like the Super Bowl exceed local 
xviii 
capabilities or capacities, local executives have a mechanism for petition that attempts to 
adjudicate federal and state equities. Federal and state officials consider the size, federal 
participation, significance, size, location, duration of the event, media coverage, threat 
environment, and the availability of state or local resources. This conversation provides an 
objective model that could be duplicated or emulated for use in the same kind of federal–
state conversations that differentiate Guard action in the homeland. 
The DoD struggles to adjudicate the Guard’s dual nature. Its existing doctrine and 
directives do not anticipate Guard action in response to large-scale, complex disasters, and 
there is room for new, or clearer, directives describing how the Guard operates 
domestically outside DoD strictures. New guidance should adjudicate the jurisdictional 
space between HD and HS and provide a way to engage in a federalism discussion to 
differentiate disasters that are national matters from disasters that are state matters. State 
Guards engaged in state matters respond in state active duty and accomplish HS actions. 
For national matters, especially in the context of large-scale, complex disasters, new policy 
needs to more effectively guide the Guard in accomplishing federally funded, state-
controlled HS. Ultimately, legislators need to look for improvements to Title 32 of the U.S. 
Code, which relates to Guard training, or to the language in Title 42, which relates to the 
Stafford Act. These improvements will serve as the foundation to improve guidance and 
remove legal and fiscal barriers to new DoD doctrine able to guide National Guard 
domestic action more effectively.  
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This thesis proposes that adjudicating whether a disaster is a national or state matter 
has important implications for how federal agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD), 
and the National Guards should respond.1 When Guard units operate within their states 
under the governors’ direction, they are often accomplishing parochial state matters. When 
the DoD operates at the behest of lead federal agencies and is reimbursed from the federal 
budget, it is implicitly accomplishing federal matters. However, when National Guard 
forces from an unaffected state are employed in support of an affected state, the federal-to-
state demarcation becomes less clear. This research analyzes why this demarcation is 
unclear and what guidance contributes to this ambiguity. 
The DoD has three distinct domestic missions: homeland security (HS), homeland 
defense (HD), and defense support to civil authorities (DSCA).2 The DoD’s core military 
doctrine relating to civil support clarifies that these terms “are not interchangeable.”3 
Although several directives describe how National Guard forces can be integrated into 
homeland defense and attempt to describe National Guard roles in DSCA, limited national 
guidance relates to the Guard’s (or even the DoD’s) role in homeland security. This paucity 
of guidance exists despite the National Strategy for Homeland Security’s direction that 
active-duty Guard and reserve forces must improve their combined capacity to prevent 
terrorism and support both manmade and natural disaster response and recovery.4 For DoD 
and Guard administrators to operate effectively in the homeland, they must have clear 
                                                 
1 The National Guards (plural) are 54 distinct and independent Guards representing their respective 
states and territories. The use of the National Guard (singular) refers to all 54 operating as a single military 
component. The reference to “state Guards” throughout this thesis includes the four non-state Guards 
(Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and Washington, DC), and the “state governor” is the chief 
executive over these Guards. 
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Joint Publication 3-28 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2013), I-2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_28.pdf? 
ver=2018-11-29-083820-613. 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-2. 
4 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington DC: Homeland 
Security Council, October 2007), 51, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_ 
2007.pdf. 
2 
guidance delineating HD, HS, and DSCA action. Although these activities describe 
domestic action, they have important differences with implications to domestic military 
support in general.  
Disaster response activities occur under the guidance and protection of the law. The 
constitutional and legal systems of checks and balances that guide daily government action 
in the homeland apply equally to military disaster response. For example, the American 
idea of federalism creates a necessary balance and tension between national and state 
authorities, even within homeland security considerations. These foundational principles 
provide the framework within which agencies like the DoD and state Guards must operate. 
However, the Guard occupies a space between the purely federal and purely state and, 
therefore, complicates discrete treatment within this framework. DoD doctrine and 
instructions describe its own operations in the homeland as well as state National Guard 
integration into DoD domestic action but do not adequately guide National Guard 
operations within the homeland apart from DoD action. This research examines how 
federalism affects the doctrinal and directive space between purely federal National Guard 
action in support of the DoD accomplishing matters of national concern and the Guard’s 
state action accomplishing state matters.  
In addition to the implications of federalism that relate to the (governmental) level 
of domestic action, jurisdictional considerations relate to the type of domestic mission. 
When the DoD and the Guard operate in the homeland, the action needs to be adjudicated 
to determine whether it is a matter of HD or HS. HD is adequately defined in joint doctrine, 
but little military guidance describes or informs HS tasks or how these tasks differ from 
other domestic action. It is self-evident why the DoD should have primacy in its homeland 
defense role, and it is also reasonable to envision valuable DoD resources that could and 
should be made available to other federal agencies accomplishing HS activities in a 
disaster. What is missing in the doctrine is language for how the Guard is employed in the 
space between a purely HS response and an event in which DoD HD involvement becomes 
necessary.  
Admittedly, the Guard’s ability to operate as a federal or state entity makes this 
doctrine difficult to define. Figure 1 provides insight into the spectrum of missions, 
3 
authorities, jurisdictions, and fiscal environments within which the Guard operates. The 
overlapping spectrum is a key difficulty in providing guidance that is widely applicable to 
Guard action. DoD guidance serves its own purpose and describes how it operates in the 
domestic environment. References to the Guard, therefore, naturally focus on its 
integration into DoD activities rather than operations distinct from DoD activities. DoD 
guidance describes how the Guard integrates into DoD operations but fails to acknowledge 
that the DoD normally integrates into operations in which the Guard has primacy—in 
support of state-led response and recovery. National Guard resources have a preeminent 
role in domestic homeland security operations, and Guard soldiers and airmen are the 
nation’s primary military response force.5 Nevertheless, DoD doctrine and directives 
remain largely silent in recognizing the Guard’s obvious leadership role in military 
homeland security roles. 
 
Figure 1. National Guard Role in the Full Spectrum of State and 
Federal Missions6 
                                                 
5 Bryan Blackmore and Stan Fields, eds., Domestic Operational Law: 2015 Handbook for Judge 
Advocates (Charlottesville, VA: Center for Law and Military Operations, 2015), 3. 
6 Adapted from Frank Grass, “Unity of Effort” (presentation, United States Northern Command’s Dual 
Status Commander Course, Colorado Springs, CO, January 2019). 
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In addition to the question of federalism and adjudication between activities that 
are homeland defense or security, this research also proposes that the size of a disaster 
factors into how the DoD and the Guard should operate. The magnitude of the disaster 
closely correlates with the federalism discussion and, thus, whether it is a federal or state 
matter. However, there are no definitive guides relating the two. Large hurricanes routinely 
strike multiple states along the east coast, but the response is often well within the 
capability and capacity of the local communities involved. Conversely, a single attack on 
the Twin Towers resulted in a national response. Likewise, Hurricane Katrina struck only 
a few states yet precipitated a national response. National special security events are pre-
planned actions, such as the Super Bowl or World Series, where a local event assumes 
national significance. Events like these and large-scale, complex disasters should be 
explored for their ability to provide the DoD a doctrinal roadmap for navigating this 
discussion.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How should military doctrine for operations in the homeland be refined to better 
employ the National Guard? 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research developed out of the 2017 hurricane season when Hurricanes Harvey, 
Maria, and Irma led to a national disaster recovery effort. At the tactical level, National 
Guardsmen were instrumental in the success of these recovery efforts. However, senior 
Guard leaders deployed them amid a confusing blizzard of internal debate surrounding 
proper employment.7 The debate rested on a central question: Were the disasters a national 
concern and, therefore, a federal responsibility, or were the responses independent state 
matters? This then-unanswered question has had implications for what doctrinal space 
National Guard forces should occupy. 
                                                 
7 This information came from the author’s involvement in daily teleconferences with the National 
Guard Bureau and state National Guard leadership during response operations to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, 
and Maria in 2017. 
5 
This research is informed by domestic disasters like Hurricanes Katrina, Sandy, 
Harvey, Maria, and Irma and by the attacks on 9/11, but it is not an effort to explore these 
events specifically. This research is more interested in describing a workable framework 
for the next Hurricane Katrina than it is in describing the environment of past disasters. 
However, these past events are useful in pointing to the challenges associated with Guard 
employment in the homeland, and this thesis uses national catastrophic plans to validate 
the discussion. FEMA has described several national complex disasters, and these can be 
used as hypothetical scenarios within which to evaluate the limitations of existing law, 
doctrine, and instructions informing military use in the homeland.8 These guiding 
documents are the foundational sources for the proposed research. 
This thesis focuses on policy options analysis by looking at existing policy and 
developing an outline for improved or supplemental policy options. The elements, actors, 
and constitutional and legal variables all affect this policy landscape, so this thesis 
differentiates and contextualizes their contributions to this problem space. Proposed policy 
options are ultimately judged against their ability to address the problem of employing 
National Guard forces in the context of one of FEMA’s national catastrophic disasters. 
Several actors have interests and equities associated with this research. The 
literature review contains an undercurrent of debate wherein active duty and Guard leaders 
fiercely fight for preeminence in the homeland, often at the expense of the other’s position. 
As the research explores the policy landscape associated with each actor, it acknowledges 
each perspective. A policy solution that corrects inequities for one party at the expense of 
another does not serve the overall homeland security community. Every effort was made 
to acknowledge the legitimate constraints, strengths, and legal boundaries associated with 
each actor’s position in this landscape.  
The research begins with insight into the history of the Guard and its role 
augmenting the DoD in U.S. combat operations. The thesis then describes HS, HD, and 
DSCA doctrines from the DoD’s perspective and defines how and when the Guard operates 
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in these doctrinal spaces. HS, HD, and DSCA doctrinal spaces need to be understood before 
they can be used as lenses through which Guard action can be viewed. Guard action in 
support of these mission types is described on a national scale and as important actors at 
the state level. During these conversations, the thesis points to existing legislation or policy 
guidance that better enables action with HS, HD, or DSCA or where national- or state-level 
action is more clearly defined for the Guard. These exemplars are signposts pointing to 
solutions applicable to the larger doctrinal and fiscal friction points that must be overcome 
if Guard forces are to be better employed in the homeland.  
Of all the variables associated with disaster response, most practitioners affirm two 
central questions guiding response: Who is in charge, and who is paying? These key ideas 
are used to analyze effective Guard use in FEMA’s complex scenarios. The research design 
focuses on matters of economics and funding, authority, and command and control to 
assess whether proposed solutions address the shortfalls in existing guidance. At the 
conclusion of the thesis, these core issues serve as litmus tests for the ambiguity in existing 
doctrine, particularly in the context of a multi-state natural disaster, while providing insight 
into how that guidance should be modified. FEMA’s catastrophic disasters serve as 
evaluative scenarios to test the effectiveness of current doctrine and to apply supplemental 
guidance that evolves from the research.  
While ideas like HD and DSCA provide frameworks for DoD action in the 
homeland, they fail to consider other homeland security conditions outside these models. 
This thesis provides a policy outline describing the military homeland-security 
environment outside HD and makes a case for the National Guard being a primary actor in 
HS, not a secondary actor as implied in the DoD’s DSCA guidance. Instead of forcing the 
DoD to adjudicate this jurisdictional minefield solely within its own doctrine and 
directives, new—or clearer—directives could better describe how the Guard operates 
domestically outside the DoD’s (federal) strictures. This clarifying guidance should not 
describe how the Guard integrates into limited support roles for the DoD but how it 
supports discrete homeland security operations independent of, or in coordination with, the 
DoD. In the short term, this thesis may be most important in its ability to provide the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) insight into how to properly source military 
7 
support to homeland security activities and to codify how this should be accomplished. 
Ultimately, this work demonstrates that military doctrine for operations in the homeland—
and legislation aimed at describing appropriate authorities and funding—must be refined 
to better employ the National Guard. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review follows discussions relating to the role of the National Guard 
in HS and specifically what doctrine guides the HS enterprise in the employment of DoD 
and Guard forces during domestic response operations. The literature review seeks to 
explain the history of the Guard as a strategic reserve to the DoD, accomplishing military 
objectives across the globe. This history points to concurrent relevance and increasing 
domestic demands in matters of homeland defense and homeland security. The literature 
describes how these domestic missions have evolved through the emergence of 
contemporary threats to national security and through an increasingly important military 
presence in disaster response. The attacks on 9/11 and the Hurricane Katrina response 
precipitated a national discussion on matters of HS, and the cited works demonstrate how 
this new concept informed and guided military action. After these events, federal agencies 
reorganized to address this priority mission area, and the DoD and the Guard sought to 
describe jurisdictional and doctrinal lines of demarcation. Literature focused on military 
action in the homeland often takes a position on these demarcations and invariably asserts 
either DoD or Guard primacy, often at the expense of the other. Ultimately, the literature 
points to the need for further discussion as the DoD and the Guard seek to better understand 
their roles in the homeland.  
Most discussions relating to the role of the Guard in the homeland begin with its 
constitutional and historical foundation. Although not directly correlating with the modern 
HS narrative, some of the history alludes to the tension between the active component 
(“standing army”) and the state-based reserve component (“militia”). Michael Doubler’s 
history of the Army National Guard describes the constitutional separation of powers and 
the War Powers Act as the basis for the DoD and Guard as separate entities while outlining 
key legislative actions relating to their organization.9 His work highlights the formative 
legislation that led to the modern military, with particular attention to the Militia Acts of 
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1903 and 1908 and the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920. Significantly, the 1916 
Act was the act that renamed the Militia as the National Guard. Doubler’s work is 
academically rigorous and exhaustively annotated, providing scholars of Guard history a 
wealth of source documents for every conceivable period.  
Two positions are considered axiomatic throughout this work. First, the Guard 
provides significant depth for the DoD in accomplishing its national security objectives 
across the globe, and second, the Guard has been a consistent actor in the homeland. 
Doubler’s history makes these points effectively and, although his first tome ends in 2000, 
he has authored a similarly exhaustive three-volume account of the National Guard’s role 
after 9/11 as a part of the war on terror.10 These latter works take care to describe and assert 
the importance of Guard action in operations overseas, in HD, and as a homeland security 
force. Where DoD doctrinarians may be reserved about the Guard’s role in homeland 
security, Doubler does not equivocate on the Guard’s unique position in this doctrinal 
space. Scholarly works relating to the Guard’s history, including one by Steenson, 
invariably cite Doubler.  
Two defining moments in contemporary HS history are indisputably the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, and the hurricanes of 2005. There is a great deal of 
literature on both of these domestic disasters, and both the DoD and Guard played roles in 
the response and recovery after each event. However, the purpose of this thesis is not to 
analyze these events outside their utility in defining the legislative and policy environment 
that followed them. The 9/11 attacks led to a stream of homeland security presidential 
directives (HSPDs), which had to be interpreted and implemented by agencies tasked with 
defending the homeland. A series of key national policies were issued—including National 
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1, Organization of the National Security Council 
System, and the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS)—that unify the activities 
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of all agencies with equity in domestic security.11 The value of these directives lies in their 
influence on the DoD’s policy decisions since their publication. On the first line of his 
introduction to the 2002 NSHS, President Bush notes the importance of 9/11, and in the 
2007 NSHS, he adds Hurricane Katrina as a defining moment in the HS narrative.12 In 
many ways, the 2002 NSHS and the 2007 NSHS are, respectively, responses to 9/11 and 
Hurricane Katrina. More explicitly, while 9/11 was the progenitor of contemporary 
dialogue on HS, Hurricane Katrina was its first test. 
William DeMaso, writing as an Air Force fellow at Air University, authored The 
Relationship between Homeland Defense and Homeland Security: U.S. Northern 
Command’s Rubik’s Cube as an early, post-9/11 insight into the demarcations between HD 
and HS.13 He intuited the growing need for doctrinal clarity as DHS and the DoD worked 
to describe jurisdictional boundaries and alliances. DeMaso concludes that HD and HS 
contribute to overall national security, but response and jurisdictional divisions need to be 
carefully considered in the context of each domestic disaster.14 His work does mention the 
Guard and alludes to its unique ability to support activities across the spectrum of HS and 
HD. There is an imperative to use the lenses of HD and HS to play to the strengths of each 
organization and to determine modes of cooperation and mutual support. These 
perspectives instruct responsible agencies as they tackle future challenges while guiding 
supporting and integral agencies like the National Guard.  
A literature review of the Guard would not be complete without mentioning 
Timothy J. Lowenberg’s contributions to describing the Guard’s role in HS and HD. While 
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serving as the adjutant general of Washington State’s National Guard, Lowenberg was a 
firm defender of Guard primacy in the homeland. In the aftermath of Katrina, the senior 
active-duty general officer charged with domestic military support advocated for increased 
authority during catastrophic disasters.15 Lowenberg was adamantly opposed to this 
position, describing it as a “policy of domestic regime change.”16 Before that, his advocacy 
for the Guard led to the publication of a National Guard Association position paper, The 
Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security.17 In this paper, 
Lowenberg vigorously presses for several changes that lay the foundation for the Reserve 
Forces Policy Board, which is discussed later in this chapter. His unequivocal position cuts 
directly to core strategic tensions. While the literature that follows attempts to reconcile 
these tensions through reasoned appeals to DoD and Guard parity and cooperation as well 
as the refinement of command and control relationships in a total-force environment, 
Lowenberg presses further. He advances that the Guard’s dual nature is best suited to 
bridge HD and HS actions at both the state and federal level.18 Lowenberg specifically 
notes the ambiguity in doctrinal and policy guidance proposed in this thesis. He observes 
“bright lines” of demarcation between the DoD and DHS, respectively conducting HD and 
HS activities, and notes their jurisdictional and fiscal implications.19 These bright lines 
form the basis of a question posed to the Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War 
College, noted at the conclusion of this literature review. 
Besides his position as an adjutant general in Washington and as a National Guard 
judge advocate general, Lowenberg also served as chairman of the Homeland Security 
Committee of the Adjutants General Association and of the Governors Homeland Security 
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Advisors Council of the National Governors Association.20 The National Guard 
Association’s public obituary for Lowenberg notes his national renown and expertise in 
matters of HD and HS.21 His insights should be at the core of any further discussion on the 
DoD’s and the Guard’s roles in the homeland and how HS and HD directives should guide 
their activities. General Lowenberg’s writings continue to influence the guardsmen who 
advocate for these and other Guard initiatives. 
Lowenberg was not alone in describing examples of disunity highlighted by 
Katrina. In 2006, the House of Representatives published a report on how well the nation 
prepared for and responded to Hurricane Katrina.22 The nation’s greatest domestic trial 
after 9/11 highlighted numerous HS processes that still required refinement. A key 
criticism from this document was ineffective DoD and DHS coordination.23 This report 
points to a lingering uncertainty between the DoD and DHS that may be the first inkling 
of both agencies’ attempts to grasp their roles in the homeland. A great deal of discussion 
also centers on the DoD’s Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)—the command 
designed to lead DoD operations within the continental United States—and its interaction 
with the states. The 2006 report chastises the states and USNORTHCOM for failing to 
anticipate and plan for domestic emergency situations.24 To that end, National Guard 
leaders propose that planning actions between the states and the military would be more 
effective if led by experienced Guard officers and not USNORTHCOM.25  
Due to insights like this, the report is an appropriate place to begin discussing DoD 
and Guard roles in the homeland. Although this thesis points to ambiguity in definitions 
relating to HD, HS, and DSCA, the bipartisan committee that authored the report did not 
address these issues. The committee describes the complexity of state and federal 
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integration but stops short of advocating for a larger role for the Guard.26 Despite Guard 
leaders like Lowenberg, who emphatically point to the Guard as the natural vehicle for this 
integration, the report does not support this claim. The overriding theme within the Katrina 
report, and military postmortems from Katrina, is a need for more robust command and 
control, communication, and integration. Ultimately, because the report’s authors fail to 
take a position on how these challenges can be addressed doctrinally, the report’s findings 
have become marching orders to the DoD, DHS, and the Guard to independently fortify 
their positions rather than define lanes of jurisdiction. It could even be argued that the 
report has been used as the basis of a national dialogue on whether certain premises of 
federalism need to be readdressed in the context of their impediment to effective disaster 
response. 
Efforts to fortify DoD primacy and provide doctrinal clarity in the homeland are 
often pursued through appeals to increase federal jurisdiction in disasters. The most 
alarming example came in 2007 when Congress attempted to amend the Insurrection Act. 
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Sausville in his Army War College thesis highlights this act as a 
misguided effort to solve the challenges identified in the Katrina report by strengthening 
federal power and providing greater authority to the DoD.27 Sausville points to the 
language in the act, in which Senator Warner recommends the review and amendment of 
“insurrection statutes” to more easily federalize the Guard into service under the DoD.28 
Warner and the other authors of this amendment understood the need for jurisdictional 
clarity and unity of action during disaster response, but they chose to disregard the other 
recommendations, proposing a more prominent role for the Guard. The act acknowledges 
the advantage of having a single voice for military involvement in the homeland but argues 
the DoD should assume that role. Sausville’s paper is useful in describing the motivations 
for the act and the reasons why it was eventually repudiated and repealed. This act sought 
to expand the president’s application of the Insurrection Act and, thereby, remove a key 
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barrier to Title 10 involvement in the HS mission. More profoundly for guardsmen, the 
Insurrection Act provides a means to federalize the Guard, decreasing the states’ control of 
their Guard forces. Sausville shows how Congress strongly opposed this expansion of 
presidential powers and points to the federalization of the National Guard, subordinate to 
the DoD, as an unacceptable proposition. If a single entity is to have supremacy in the 
military HS dialogue, Sausville’s paper goes a long way toward making the case that it 
cannot be the DoD. 
At the same time that Sausville was defending state primacy in HS, Lieutenant 
Colonel Michael Steenson was advocating specifically for the Guard as the preeminent 
actor for HS. Steenson proposes the Guard as the obvious “interagency bridge” between 
the states and DHS as well as proposes National Guard primacy in military homeland 
security actions.29 His thesis takes this argument to its natural conclusion, suggesting that 
clarity in roles between the DoD and the Guard should result in reorganization, resource 
rebalancing, and the proper allocation of domestic military funding. Steenson’s thesis, 
though nine years old, still provides a sound solution to many of the problems that 
contemporary disasters highlight.  
Steenson comes closest to Lowenberg in recommending solutions that address the 
larger strategic challenges associated with DoD and Guard interaction in the homeland. 
The scholarly work allocated to these challenges all centers on finding equilibrium between 
the DoD and the Guard at best—and marginalization of the National Guard at worst. 
Steenson appears to be alone in an effort to reconcile these differences by advancing a 
greater role for the Guard as a solution to these tensions. Although his work provides a 
solid framework upon which to describe the military HS environment, there is still more to 
do. Steenson’s position is made by drawing from anecdote and common sense yet does not 
peer into the murky doctrinal divide between HS and HD. 
Steenson makes several cases for Guard preeminence in matters of HS. He gets 
closest to strategic matters of doctrine and definitive propriety when he points to Guard 
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involvement in missions like civil disturbance operations, border security, and national 
special security events, where Guard forces are unconstrained by Posse Comitatus.30 
Sausville would remind readers that some might see these restrictions as mere legal 
loopholes to be circumvented; nonetheless, they do point the academic discussion more 
firmly toward Guard primacy in the homeland. Steenson points to National Guard civil 
support teams (CSTs) and counter-drug units as specific examples of HS successes in the 
homeland. He rightly points to the reassuring precedence of units like these, which are 
properly provisioned in law and backed with the financial resources to succeed in the 
homeland. He appeals to logic through the economy of the Guard, as a force capable of 
accomplishing missions as diverse as the active component but at a reduced cost, while 
noting the concurrent financial benefit through its nationally distributed presence.31 
However, an appeal to logic and precedence does not take the argument far enough. These 
arguments illustrate how the Guard can succeed, almost by exception, but not explicitly 
how the Guard should be employed—and when and why the DoD should not be. 
While Sausville addresses an effort to adjudicate the internal military dialogue, the 
Katrina report also demands greater interagency cooperation. Steenson goes further to 
propose that the Guard should be that interagency bridge. Operations in the homeland will 
be successful when all levels up and down the government and across federal agencies 
cooperate. The Guard is uniquely qualified to serve as the connective tissue between all 
these domestic stakeholders. As a consequence, Steenson understands that even if the DoD 
and Guard can agree on their roles in the homeland, that alone may be insufficient. 
Doctrinal guidance and military support will be ineffective so long as the larger HS 
enterprise is unclear about military roles in disasters.  
Most of the literature referenced for this work focuses on legal or jurisdictional 
demarcations associated with HD and HS. In defining boundaries between these mission 
areas, threats to the homeland must factor into the discussion. In the HD discussion, the 
threat landscape illustrates how threats, their magnitude, and their effects guide doctrinal 




demarcations. However, the threat of terrorism creates additional complexity and deserves 
separate treatment. The 9/11 attacks and their terroristic premise turned a normally 
outward-looking national security conversation inward. The national dialogue contained 
references to terrorism as a threat to the homeland, and as the DoD took the fight to the 
hills of Afghanistan, doctrinarians naturally assumed they should be free to prosecute their 
enemy in every domain and every geographical space. Of all the threats to the homeland, 
terrorism provides the greatest challenge to the DoD as it struggles with finding the 
demarcation between the terrorist threat that is a matter of homeland defense and the 
terrorist threat that is homeland security. A terrorist making his way across the paths and 
trails of Iraq, intent on transporting a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) to the United 
States, is an HD matter. When that same terrorist is making his way through the woods on 
the U.S.-side of the Canadian border, is it still HD, or has it become HS? The terrorist 
threat, described through questions like this, requires careful consideration for the DoD 
and DHS and implies concurrent complications for the Guard and other counter-terrorism 
enablers.  
Colonel Jerry Cusic’s Army War College thesis addresses the complicated terrorist 
threat landscape.32 Cusic sees no ambiguity in the aforementioned scenario and does not 
hesitate with the appropriate demarcations. Cusic pays homage to Lowenberg’s “bright 
lines” by describing a “seam” between HD and HS. He proposes the DoD should consider 
whether threats are matters of warfare or criminal acts.33 The anecdote of the terrorist 
carrying a WMD through the northern states describes a criminal matter, firmly on the HS 
side of the seam, and Cusic makes a strong argument that the DoD should not have primacy 
in such a case. The DoD is legally constrained and ill-resourced domestically and should 
focus on stopping terrorists before they reach the United States.34 Like many of the other 
Guard authors, Cusic is also quick to point out the Guard’s ability to operate across this 
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seam as a force to augment both the DoD in defeating terrorists overseas and law 
enforcement in support of local domestic response.35 
Literature associated with military action in the homeland would be incomplete 
without reference to how these conversations are captured within the DoD’s own 
publications. Military joint doctrine is designed to present “fundamental principles and 
overarching guidance” with applicability to all members of the Armed Forces.36 While 
tenants and principles of warfare span centuries of application and theory, doctrine must 
be malleable enough to respond to emerging national security priorities and the evolution 
of national policy. At the same time, the subordinate legal landscape is often extremely 
complex and nuanced. Matters of constitutional law often prescribe action in the homeland, 
and although military leaders often profess their familiarity with these matters, they are 
regularly admonished to keep their judge advocates close. A useful and regularly updated 
reference for military commanders operating in the homeland is published by the Army’s 
Center for Law and Military Operations. The center’s Domestic Operational Law 
Handbook for Judge Advocates is an essential aid to military leaders navigating domestic 
operations and efficiently consolidates their legal, doctrinal, and instructive landscape.37 
The handbooks from 2011, 2015, and 2018 are critical references and background for this 
work. Additionally, the National Guard’s own judge advocate has published a domestic 
law and policy guide, which was updated in 2018, expressly in response to several legal 
issues raised during Guard involvement in the hurricanes and fires of 2017.38 
Civilian uncertainty relating to military roles in disasters is an often-repeated 
lament in after-action reports. In their 2011 journal article, Apte and Heath note that 
civilian disaster relief professionals are unclear about the DoD’s domestic roles and 
                                                 
35 Cusic, 36. 
36 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017). 
37 Jeffrey Spears, Brian Robinson, and Ben Gullo, eds., Domestic Operational Law Handbook for 
Judge Advocates (Charlottesville, VA: Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011); Blackmore and 
Fields, Domestic Operational Law; and Ted Martin and Corey Thomas, eds., Domestic Operational Law: 
2018 Handbook for Judge Advocates (Charlottesville, VA: Center for Law and Military Operations, 2018). 
38 Christian Rofrano, 2019 Domestic Operations Law and Policy, 2nd ed. (Arlington, VA: National 
Guard Bureau, 2018). 
19 
limitations during disaster response.39 Their article proposes that disaster practitioners do 
not have clear guidance for how to employ the DoD in the homeland. The inability of 
civilian practitioners to differentiate among the Guard, reservists, and the DoD compounds 
this problem. Apte and Heath’s article is useful because it references work polled directly 
from civilian emergency managers and, therefore, adds an empirical perspective to the 
challenges associated with military involvement in the homeland. The article proposes a 
need for shared awareness and coordination between civilian and military response 
communities and better insight into their respective roles and capabilities.40  
Apte and Heath introduce a solution to enhanced mutual awareness, the dual status 
commander (DSC). The DSC, which Steenson briefly addresses in his work, resulted from 
recommendations in the Katrina report. Able to command both Title 10 and Guard forces, 
the DSC is described as a solution to the “disunity of effort” and a way to integrate DoD 
and Guard forces. Apte and Heath propose that military guidance be updated to describe 
the DSC and that this arrangement be communicated to civilian disaster practitioners. Their 
suggestion to incorporate a DSC into current DoD guidance has, for the most part, been 
implemented. This solution to creating unity of effort appears in numerous discussions of 
DoD and Guard interaction in the homeland. Policy papers, theses, and articles from the 
last decade are replete with discussions of the DSC as an HS panacea, able to solve all 
military-in-the-homeland ails. The adoption of this recommendation in the article by Apte 
and Heath and updated references to the DSC in doctrine are institutional 
acknowledgments of the need for unity. However, neither Apte and Heath nor Steenson 
question whether DSCs go far enough in creating unity between the DoD and the Guard. 
As the DSC manifests only in event response, it could be seen as a Band-Aid on disparate 
and disjointed institutional agendas. None of these authors takes the discussion far enough; 
all fail to note the institutional and doctrinal barriers to military operations in the homeland 
that necessitate the DSC in the first place. 
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As USNORTHCOM and the Guard continue to refine their processes in the 
homeland, Guard practitioners have begun to gain greater insight into the foundational 
challenges associated with domestic response. In 2012, the Reserve Forces Policy Board 
(RFPB) proposed a series of recommendations that cut across several perceived inequities 
between the active and reserve components.41 Among the seven recommendations, five are 
directly relevant to matters of Guard action in HS and HD. Two recommendations propose 
important clarification to activation authorities important to Guard operations in HS and 
HD while three propose fiscal improvements deemed essential to Guard deployment in 
disasters. If the after-action report from Katrina defines the problem—Sausville, as well as 
Apte and Heath, points to DoD efforts to resolve these problems—the RFPB is the reserve 
component’s attempt to capture the solution narrative, making recommendations that 
would empower Guard domestic operations.  
The board suggests that Guard employment in natural disasters is hampered by an 
inability to train for the domestic mission, that there is unclear guidance on how to employ 
federal funding of guardsmen in a disaster, and that a properly resourced, well-defined 
disaster response fund could “minimize financial risk to DoD accounts.”42 The 
recommendations are highly technical because they describe military problems to a senior 
military audience. There are, nevertheless, valuable insights into the challenges associated 
with military response in the homeland. This memorandum is especially useful in its 
introduction of the fiscal environment surrounding disasters. The RFPB does not shy away 
from the fiscal implications of disaster response and points to policy guidance that hampers 
response precisely because the financial factors are poorly articulated or contradictory. In 
other words, a purely theoretical solution that clarifies doctrine but is fiscally untenable is 
of no use. 
Ryan Burke and Sue McNeil are two influential voices in matters of military action 
in the homeland. Burke and McNeil explore domestic DoD and Guard action in a 2015 
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study of the military response to Hurricane Sandy.43 In this work, they observe that the 
DoD’s mission assignment process, which describes how DoD provides DSCA, does not 
adequately serve the needs of responding commanders and needs to be better defined.44 
Additionally, the authors return to the recommendations of the RFPB, asserting that dual-
status commanders have been hampered by ambiguous language in 32 U.S.C. § 502f—a 
core paragraph in National Guard legal authority. Their paper proposes that the language 
should be revised to describe how to better access federal funding of National Guard 
personnel and asserts that federally funded, state-controlled guardsmen could be a more 
appropriate sourcing solution for DSCA than active-duty forces.45 Clarity in sourcing and 
updates to the language in Title 32, U.S. Code, is central to the recommendations in this 
thesis.  
Burke and McNeil were also asked to undertake perhaps the most radical 
exploration of the Guard’s domestic roles. The project came at the behest of the Army War 
College’s “Key Strategic Issues List,” which proposes diverse research issues that must be 
addressed if the DoD is to serve the needs of the nation.46 The 2014–2015 list’s authors 
asked whether the National Guard should be realigned under the DHS.47 The question 
explores whether the state Guards’ ability to operate as either state or federal entities, 
depending on their operational authority, provides them an opportunity to operate in a 
homeland security role subordinate to DHS.48 Although their federal role in support of the 
Army and Air Force is clear, the Strategic Studies Institute asks whether the domestic 
mission—to support states—might be better aligned with DHS, not the DoD. Answers to 
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48 McNeil and Burke. 
22 
this question have important implications for the DoD’s and the Guard’s roles in the 
homeland. By answering this question in 2017, Burke and McNeil were forced to take the 
discussion beyond precedent and the anecdotes previous authors presented and to probe 
more deeply into the strategic and doctrinal environments within which the Guard operates. 
Although Burke and McNeil conclude that the Guard should not be aligned under DHS, 
their findings are still relevant for further study. 
Burke and McNeil echo Cusic’s “seam between HS and HD” idea, which provides 
a doctrinal baseline from which to differentiate roles and responsibilities among the Guard, 
DHS, and the DoD.49 Their research is important because the conclusions are drawn from 
interviews with senior military and civilian domestic response practitioners. Although 
objective and doctrinally precise policy would be a preferred end state for this study, the 
subjective and practical HS landscape must also be acknowledged as relevant. Their work 
reiterates the complex legislative, legal, political, and fiscal environments that surround 
any Guard discussion and attempts to clear this haze.  
Burke and McNeil’s work is also important because its conclusion—not to place 
the Guard under DHS—results from arguments for each agency’s roles that are applicable 
beyond their research question. The Guard’s role as the DoD’s operational reserve 
highlights the importance of its overseas roles. These important federal roles reinforce the 
services’ stake in Guard success and effectiveness. Additionally, the paper points to the 
need for a “Hometown Force” responsive to local priorities and makes the same support-
to-law-enforcement observations as Steenson does. Disappointingly, the authors propose 
recommendations more in line with Senator Warren’s amendment to the Insurrection Act, 
looking for ways to more easily federalize the Guard.50 Instead of exploring solutions that 
better define Guard roles in HS and HD, the authors propose a greater federal role from 
the Title 10 reserve force as a way to provide the surge capacity for the DoD while 
circumventing governors’ wishes.51 These recommendations fail to heed Sausville’s 
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51 McNeil and Burke. The Reserves, in this context, are the Title 10, part-time members of the active 
duty force, not Title 32 guardsmen.  
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warnings, and both of these recommendations marginalize the Guard in the homeland. 
While attempting to subordinate the Guard to federal authority, the report concedes the 
importance of the Guard. Despite the recommendations in favor of increased Title 10 
authority, the authors do conclude with some language affirming the Guard’s roles in the 
homeland. They credit the Guard’s “imperative for domestic security and response 
requirements” and recognize its particular affinity for, and critical role in, appropriate 
domestic or overseas missions.52 Clearly, even the most contemporary exploration of the 
DoD’s and the Guard’s roles in the homeland contains a certain element of equivocation 
and uncertainty.  
This literature review has introduced a few of the works that most closely correlate 
with the matters of HS and HD as well as their implications for DoD and Guard operations 
in the homeland. The works provide insight into the complexity that surrounds military 
operations in the homeland while pointing to the need for refinement and research into 
better modes of military cooperation and integration. Moreover, the works indicate there is 
ample room for further discussion. 
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III. THE NATIONAL GUARD IN THE HOMELAND 
This thesis proposes that DoD doctrine does not properly serve all National Guard 
action in the homeland. Exploring the relationship between the DoD and the Guard, some 
of the historical precedents that frame the current argument, and the military’s roles in the 
homeland help to explain the doctrinal ambiguity. The discussion surrounding the Guard 
is invariably complicated by exhaustive background explanations describing the Guard’s 
federal and state nature. This thesis assumes a certain familiarity with the National Guard. 
To make it accessible to DoD and other non-Guard readers, Appendix A includes a 
description of Guard duty statuses and serves as a useful primer. This chapter first describes 
the Guard’s history, born of the early militia, highlighting its symbiotic relationship with 
the DoD and its dual nature as a state and federal resource. It then details the doctrinal 
landscape of homeland defense (HD) and homeland security (HS), thereby explaining 
defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) as a middle ground where the DoD can provide 
HS-aligned services during disasters. Finally, it explores HD, HS, and DSCA from the 
DoD’s perspective, providing context for the challenges in the current environment, where 
doctrine designed to guide the DoD is hazy when applied to the Guard.  
A. NATIONAL GUARD HISTORY 
The DoD is a centrally controlled entity operating at the federal level of U.S. 
government. Its own directives and instructions reflect these organizational truths. 
Conversely, the Guard is composed of several distributed entities operating simultaneously 
at federal and state levels. It is, therefore, important to understand the history of the Guard 
and its dual nature as a national resource (collectively) and as independent state entities 
(separately). The National Guards of the states were founded on, and have evolved through, 
the idea of federalism, upon which the United States was built. The “militias” of the several 
states are partially autonomous organizations, which predate America’s fight for 
independence, and have long held a central role in the security and defense of the 
homeland. From the very beginning, “the militia provided the foundation for military 
success in America” whether defending against internal threats or foreign invaders or 
26 
during emancipation from England.53 During the American Revolution, the militia formed 
the basis of the new Continental Army and performed operations throughout the 13 
colonies and across all eight years of the campaign.54 These contributions “guaranteed the 
militia a permanent place as an enduring institution of the new United States” and provide 
an argument for why the Guard should remain separate and distinct from the DoD.55 
Underscoring the Guard’s importance, the Constitution “provide[s] for calling forth 
the Militia,” a defense force that could be summoned for national service.56 Additionally, 
the Second Amendment to the Constitution reaffirms the need for “a well regulated militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State.”57 These constitutional premises are 
foundational to discussions about Guard actions in the homeland because they preempt any 
effort to marginalize the Guard. America’s founding documents demand a regionally 
distributed militia force and intuit a benefit beyond a purely federal standing army. 
The founder’s distrust of a permanent standing force solidified the legitimacy and 
enduring role of the Guard, or states’ militia, for the first 150 years of America’s history.58 
Despite the inherent tensions between a regular standing force and a volunteer militia, 
legislation between 1898 and 1916 sought to align these two actors.59 This legislative 
period culminated in the National Defense Act of 1916, which “called for a composite 
Army of Regulars, Guardsmen, and Army Reservists.”60 The designation of National 
                                                 
53 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 43. 
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58 William Fields and David Hardy, “The Third Amendment and the Issue of the Maintenance of 
Standing Armies: A Legal History,” American Journal of Legal History 35, no. 4 (October 1991): 395, 
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59 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, 140. 
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A reservist is a Navy, Marine, Army or Air Force member whose service is similar to that of Guard 
personnel because they normally serve part-time. However, reservists augment the Title 10 force only 
under the authority of their service and ultimately the president. They are not under the control of a state 
governor, nor are they governed by Title 32 of the U.S. Code in the same way that a Guard soldier or 
airman is. (The Navy and Marines do not have Guard personnel.)  
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Guard stems from this act, which among other things, provided federal funding to the 
Guard and defined its role as the Army’s principal trained reserve.61 The First World War, 
the interwar years, and the Second World War that saw National Guardsmen on the beaches 
of Normandy and in the Pacific campaign solidified the Guard as the primary, federal 
reserve force.62 
In light of the scale and complexity of modern-day military engagements, the Guard 
must quickly integrate into federal units charged with fighting America’s wars. To this end, 
the U.S. Code prescribes rules for the management of the Guard. These laws ensure that 
the standards of training, discipline, heritage, doctrine, and culture between the Guard and 
the services are uniform.63 Title 32 of the U.S. Code informs the Guard, and Title 10 guides 
the military in general. In 1952, Title 32 was modified to include a fifth chapter on training 
to clarify how drills, field exercises, and participation in military education serve the 
discipline and training objectives of the Guard’s parent services.64 While early iterations 
of the law stressed the importance of the Guard’s warfighting skills and readiness to 
augment the active force, an important modification to the code was introduced in 1964. 
To provide latitude for domestic action, a subordinate chapter under chapter 5 allows 
guardsmen to “be ordered to perform training” as well as “other duty in addition to that 
prescribed [in normal monthly drills, training encampments, etc.].”65 The words “other 
duty” provide a great deal of latitude to the Guard. However, the words are ambiguous 
enough that the DoD still grapples with parameters for the Guard’s other duties. These two 
words in chapter five are an important milestone in the Guard’s modern history, and their 
domestic implications are a recurrent theme throughout this thesis.  
The Guard’s integration with the services results in a unified “total force” and is 
why, to an outside observer, it should not be immediately clear whether a soldier standing 
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on the street corner during a hurricane is active duty or in the National Guard. A regular 
soldier from the U.S. Army and a soldier from the Army National Guard wear identical 
uniforms and the same ranks and could even proudly display the same combat patches from 
overseas deployments. Their training, readiness, and appearance are practically 
indistinguishable right up to their left breast pockets, which both read “U.S. ARMY.” 
These similarities testify to the effectiveness of the training and discipline of the Guard and 
provide practical examples of how seamlessly it has augmented the active duty in global 
and domestic matters. 
Active-duty and National Guard personnel operating in overseas operations and 
alongside each other in the homeland exemplify effective and standardized training, 
equipment, and culture between the Guard and its service parents. However, these 
operational similarities do not prove alignment in matters of domestic doctrine. Two 
soldiers standing side by side on a flooded street in America may be indistinguishable in 
their training and appearance, but they could be operating in dramatically different 
doctrinal spaces, accomplishing completely separate missions. Rescued citizens may be 
ambivalent about differentiating one soldier’s HD actions from the other’s HS or DSCA 
action, but these demarcations can have profound implications for authority and financing. 
The following sections describe HD and HS to illuminate how the domestic landscape 
frames the mission environment for DoD and Guard members. Ultimately, by 
understanding these two doctrinal spaces, DoD and Guard doctrinarians can better 
understand how their soldiers and airmen can be better employed domestically.  
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B. HOMELAND DEFENSE 
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common 
defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the 
United States of America.66 
Homeland Defense is a doctrinal space with a long history, and the imperative to 
defend the United States originates at its very founding. The constitutional and 
congressional powers to provide for the common defense has resulted in a highly capable 
active-duty force in addition to the National Guard forces of the states.67 The services, 
charged with this necessary mission, have worked to enhance their capability and capacity 
to provide for a common defense resulting in an active military force that is the most 
effective and capable in the world.68 
The U.S. Code for armed forces propagates this constitutional imperative for 
activities within the homeland by directing the secretary of defense to write policy guidance 
and plans “for providing support to civil authorities” in the event of a nationally significant 
or catastrophic incident.69 Title 10 of the U.S. Code describes two lines of effort for this 
domestic support: HD and DSCA.70 The DoD interprets these constitutional and legal 
mandates and propagates written policy guidance through joint doctrine, DoD directives, 
and DoD instructions. These documents define the primary responsibility to the homeland 
as “the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical 
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infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the 
President.”71  
America’s regular standing force is composed of full-time soldiers, sailors, 
marines, and airmen. These military members are referred to as active-duty, regular, or 
standing forces and are administered by the Departments of the Army, Air Force, Navy, 
and Marine Corps, collectively under the Department of Defense, with the president of the 
United States as their commander in chief.72 Active-duty members derive their authority 
from Title 10 of the U.S. Code and are, therefore, often referred to as the Title 10 force. In 
this thesis, the terms Army or Air Force are used to denote the force composed of Title 10 
soldiers and airmen, respectively. Only the Army and the Air Force have National Guard 
counterparts in the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. 
The DoD’s primary role is to support the U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS). 
The unclassified summary of the 2018 NDS describes defense objectives of primary 
importance to the DoD.73 These objectives center on the need to project force globally, 
defend the homeland, and remain a relevant component of international order. DoD 
objectives primarily, and rightly, center on ensuring the services project lethality. This 
document affirms that the DoD’s roles in the homeland are primarily concerned with 
defense. This document asserts the DoD’s role as a primary agent for homeland defense, 
and mentions homeland security only in the context of providing assistance to interagency 
partners, such as DHS, “to address areas of economic, technological, and informational 
vulnerabilities.”74  
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Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense, is the authoritative guidance for 
commanders accomplishing or supporting homeland defense operations.75 This doctrine 
describes a diverse strategic threat environment with implications for the National Defense 
Strategy. The threats from transnational actors create risks for the U.S. cyber domain and 
its critical infrastructure while presenting existential threats against the U.S. and its allies 
in the form of WMDs. The list of U.S. adversaries is no longer restricted to peer nation-
states because even non-state actors have acquired the ability to challenge U.S. interests.76 
Amid this threat environment, as illustrated in Figure 2, common sense suggests the DoD 
should promulgate policy and guidance for defending the homeland. 
 
Figure 2. The Threat Environment as Outlined in JP 3-2777 
The two combatant commands (CCMDs) charged with primacy in the homeland 
are United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and United States Indo-Pacific 
Command (USINDOPACOM). Their primacy in matters of HD means that practically all 
other commands within the DoD portfolio assume subordinate and supporting roles in 
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accomplishing HD missions. USNORTHCOM’s genesis and missions originate partially 
from existential threats dating back to the Cold War and partially as a response to the 9/11 
attacks in 2001.78 When it was created on October 1, 2002, no “single military commander 
. . . [had been] charged with protecting the U.S. homeland since the days of George 
Washington.”79  
Although USNORTHCOM was born from the fires of 9/11, its cultural heritage 
dates back to threats from the Cold War. HD missions in a Cold War environment are not 
difficult to envision. Soviet aerospace threats, such as bombers flying across the polar cap 
intent on penetrating U.S. airspace, demanded a strategic deterrent force ready to meet 
them.80 The strategic nuclear threat alone led to the creation of the only bi-national 
command, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).81 NORAD is a 
U.S. and Canadian command expressly concerned with “aerospace warning, aerospace 
control, and maritime warning for North America.”82 Because the commander of 
USNORTHCOM is also the commander of NORAD, it is not hard to see how this historical 
and strategically imperative homeland defense mission could consume its mission 
narratives. However, as a new command with a new charter to unify DoD action in the 
homeland, USNORTHCOM had to mature beyond its NORAD roots as it grappled to 
define its reason for being. Its commanders worked to define themes or mission areas that 
supported the National Defense Strategy. USNORTHCOM focuses on threats to the 
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homeland, modes of support to lead agencies and state and local authorities, and unity 
among active-duty, Guard, and reserve forces during disasters.83 
In pure HD mission areas, where USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM have 
primacy, the implications for the Guard seem clear. In a domestic emergency, practically 
all active-duty forces and commands within the DoD become subordinate to these two 
CCMDs.84 In the same vein, the Guard makes its forces available to assume HD missions. 
A graphic representation of the DoD accomplishing HD is relatively simple. Figure 3 
displays the USNORTHCOM’s or USINDOPACOM’s combatant commanders’ sourcing 
options when contemplating a HD mission. They source the requirement with the active 
component (COMPO1) or the reserve components represented by the Title 10 Reserve 
(COMPO3) or National Guard (COMPO2).85 
Akin to its use as a strategic reserve for overseas contingency operations, the Guard 
is aligned domestically when acting as an operational reserve for matters of homeland 
defense. Unlike the active force, the Guard can operate under different authorities while 
conducting HD missions. When appropriate, the president can assume authority over Guard 
forces by federalizing them, which converts them to members of the (Title 10) active 
component with federal control and funding.86 If it is more appropriate for the respective 
governors to retain authority over their Guard forces tasked with HD missions, then they 
can pursue HD missions under state authority but with federal funding. 
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Figure 3. Sourcing Options for CCMDs Tasked with HD Missions 
In either case, the Guard’s HD activity is federally funded irrespective of who has 
control because the end result is in service to the nation.87 This demarcation between 
service to the nation and service to the state is clear in matters of HD but murky in the 
discussion of military roles in HS.  
To further reinforce the federal responsibility inherent in HD missions and to 
provide clarity to the National Guards, Title 32 of the U.S. Code was modified to include 
a chapter enumerating the Guard’s role in this important mission. In a revision to this code, 
Congress recognized the need to define clear roles for the Guard in HD. This revision, 
enacted through the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, added a chapter on 
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homeland defense activities.88 Whereas JP 3-27 gives unequivocal guidance to the DoD 
within its primary domestic role of HD, chapter 9 of Title 32, U.S. Code, lends legal 
authority and provides operational and financial guidance for the Guard’s support of the 
DoD in accomplishing HD. 
The addition of 32 U.S.C. §§ 901–908 provides legal guidance to the DoD and 
unambiguous direction for the National Guard. DoD Directive 3160.01, Homeland Defense 
Activities Conducted by the National Guard, clarifies for governors and Guard 
commanders the authorities, funding, and mechanisms whereby Guard personnel can 
participate in HD activities.89 As noted, the federal government funds Guard HD activities. 
Ultimately, for doctrine and directives to be effective, both the authority and funding must 
be clear, and these two considerations are important for HD and later descriptions of HS 
and DSCA. Notably, the HD directive does provide positive instructions for the services to 
provide training funds to the National Guard in support of HD readiness.90 
Several nationally significant and enduring missions demonstrate Guard support to 
HD. State-controlled, federally funded Air National Guard pilots performing ongoing and 
necessary proficiency training can be converted to Title 10 status to accomplish air 
sovereignty and air defense missions over U.S. airspace.91 In this case, the guardsmen are 
instantaneously federalized, fall under federal control, and become legally 
indistinguishable from the active force in authority and action. Air National Guard (ANG) 
units fulfilling these kinds of HD activities do so as an integral part of the Air Force’s 
overall defense posture. Guard units are an essential component of integrated defense 
infrastructure, and the Air Force could not accomplish these missions without Guard 
involvement. In addition to these predominately ANG combat patrols, the Guard’s 
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Northeast Tanker Task Force provides daily refueling support to the Atlantic air bridge.92 
These examples highlight the seamlessness and routine nature of Guard support to the 
active force. 
In addition to the ongoing or planned HD activities attributed to the Guard, other 
provisions ensure Guard support in emergent threats. An example of Guard personnel 
accomplishing unforeseen HD actions occurred after 9/11. The attacks had demonstrated a 
vulnerability in the nation’s transportation system, so the President worked with state 
governors to fund the activation of 7,000 guardsmen, who provided a reassuring security 
presence at 422 airports across 52 states and territories.93 Guard personnel concurrently 
protected critical infrastructure and high-profile public events. They were present at 
bridges, overpasses, nuclear power plants, and tunnels while presenting a visible deterrence 
at high-profile sporting events like the Super Bowl and New York marathon.94 In these 
scenarios, the governors retained authority over the Guard personnel, who remained in a 
Title 32 status while accomplishing federally funded activities and contributing to a unified 
HD effort.  
Guardsmen have been similarly activated to accomplish border security operations. 
They were federalized to accomplish this mission in 2002 and have been involved in border 
operations sporadically ever since including significant activations as recently as fiscal year 
2019.95 Beyond the 7,000 Guard personnel at the nation’s airports, over 16,000 soldiers 
accomplished other security missions, such as customs and border augmentation missions, 
in the years following 9/11.96 Like the ongoing missions, these unplanned HD activities 
were easily and quickly facilitated—with a clear understanding of authority and funding—
and they aligned with propagated and understood HD guidance.  
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The aforementioned HD examples include actions to mitigate or counter direct 
attacks from nation-state and non-nation-state actors against U.S. interests. Although these 
actions may initially appear doctrinally clear, even these defensive activities are not always 
so easy to decipher. For example, actions aimed at preventing terrorist attacks within the 
United States are strictly homeland security activities under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Cusic’s thesis affirms two guides to help 
doctrinarians in the terrorist discussion. First, he proposes that the national response 
framework demands and presupposes bottom-up mitigation, preparation, and response 
with local civilian authorities assuming primary responsibilities for actions in the 
homeland.97 Second, he affirms that the response to terrorist actions in the homeland should 
be seen as law enforcement action aimed at criminals.98 Since the DoD is largely proscribed 
from law enforcement actions in the homeland, these are clearly not HD matters, and the 
DoD should not assert primacy or relevancy. 
This conversation provides insight into HD and describes a mission space that is 
well defined in DoD doctrinal guidance. Moreover, the DoD’s HD doctrine, JP 3-37, 
expands its reach beyond pure HD. This doctrine addresses the ambiguity between discrete 
HD and HS activities by recognizing they may occur simultaneously and in the same 
domestic area of operation. In these cases, each agency may be charged with activities that 
influence or support the actions of the other. Threats to the homeland may have concurrent 
implications in both doctrinal spaces. To this end, the DoD added doctrine that allows for 
action in a supporting role to an HS activity while not explicitly referring to it as discrete 
HS action. In order to manage the intersections between HD and HS, DoD doctrine defines 
a third doctrinal space. Within DoD doctrine, support to a lead federal agency (LFA) is 
described as defense support to civil authorities (DSCA), which is described later in this 
chapter. First, HS, particularly in military operations, requires an explanation.  
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C. HOMELAND SECURITY 
With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our 
homeland, and our values.99 
 —Department of Homeland Security 
There are no widely accepted definitions of homeland security. HS is an idea that 
encompasses the safety, security, and resiliency of U.S. citizens, infrastructure, and ideals 
in the face of manmade and natural threats. HS addresses a wider threat environment than 
that of HD, which focuses on defeating external threats and aggression toward U.S. 
interests. Despite varied definitions, acts of terrorism aimed at the United States force 
greater attention toward the wider HS threat landscape and the management of those 
threats. Amid the significant governmental reorganization that followed 9/11, Congress 
signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and created the Department of Homeland 
Security. DHS consolidated and unified the functions and responsibilities of several federal 
agencies and departments with the goal of addressing both the threat of attacks on the 
United States and preparing for natural or manmade disasters.100 However, amid a 
concerted effort to align government functions toward a unified domestic security posture, 
explicit HS guidance was not given to the DoD. Even the purpose of creating the United 
States Northern Command, described earlier in this chapter, was not explicitly to achieve 
an HS end state. 
In 2005, the DoD propagated Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security, in an 
effort to provide doctrinal guidance describing this important mission space.101 With 9/11 
still a recent memory, this initial document blurred HS, HD, and civil support as it 
reconciled the DoD’s role in countering terrorism. The publication’s proposition that HS 
is “global in nature” and advanced through action against threats at their source improperly 
comingles HD and HS, not to mention improperly asserts that HD and civil support are 
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subordinate HS mission areas.102 To correct the inconsistencies, the DoD differentiated HD 
and civil support (DSCA) in distinct joint publications and dropped Homeland Security 
from its list of joint publications. The “3-26” designation that was used for the original 
2005 Homeland Security joint publication was repurposed for Counterterrorism.103 By 
separating terrorism from the existing Cold War approach to HD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
updated the approach to this mission area. Unfortunately, clarity in matters of 
counterterrorism coincided with a new void in stand-alone HS guidance.  
Despite the instructional void in HS, the DoD does not object to Guard operations 
in the homeland. To the contrary, all levels of government have come to expect that military 
resources and capabilities organic to the Guard should be made available for local disaster 
response activities. The 54 National Guards of the states and territories have distributed 
capacities and specialized capabilities that provide utility in domestic disaster response.104 
As long as their employment does not interfere with the DoD’s national security concerns, 
state Guards are free to engage in homeland security operations.  
Within their own states, Guard units are often geographically dispersed across 
smaller armories and installations. The distributed nature of Guard personnel and units also 
make them an obvious choice for governors and an expedient resource for state-level 
homeland security missions. With 3,200 Guard facilities in 2,700 communities and 1,000 
guardsmen in the average congressional district, their armories and personnel are a visible 
presence and a credible resource for homeland security operations.105 
Governors have a great deal of latitude in how they employ their Guards in HS 
missions. In the early hours of August 29, 2005, when Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 
Buras, Louisiana, the governors of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana already 
had 5,376 Guard personnel on state active duty (SAD), ready to provide HS support to the 
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affected communities.106 Within 24 hours, over 9,000 guardsmen were on duty, and by the 
end of the response, 46,500 of the 65,900 people deployed across the 90,000-square-mile 
operation were National Guardsmen under state-to-state support agreements.107 These 
governors took advantage of the proximity and readiness of their forces and accomplished 
law enforcement, traffic control, sheltering, security operations, and search-and-rescue 
missions within hours of the storm’s passing.108 Notably, this disaster immediately 
precipitated a discussion between the responding governors and the federal government 
about whether the disaster response was to be a local matter or a national concern.  
Although fiscal considerations may seem secondary to the doctrinal questions this 
thesis hopes to answer, adjudicating this dimension often presupposes adjudication of the 
HD, HS, and federalism concerns described throughout this thesis. When disasters exceed 
a certain threshold, governors are able to petition FEMA for federal cost-sharing resulting 
from HS missions associated with presidentially declared disaster response activities. 
President Bush made a presidential declaration for Florida on August 28, 2005, and on the 
following day, as the Hurricane struck, he followed suit for Alabama, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi, making essential federal disaster funding available.109 At the same time, the 
governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana petitioned the secretary of defense to 
provide Title 32 federal funding for their Guard personnel.110 Despite the presidential 
declaration and the secretary of homeland security’s designation of “an Incident of 
National Significance,” it took nine days before Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon 
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England approved Title 32 federal funding.111 Governors, the executive office, DHS, and 
senior Guard leaders at the National Guard Bureau and within the states were able to 
adjudicate the national significance of this HS event and appropriately deploy Guard forces 
accomplishing HS missions in a federally funded status. However, the decision to federally 
fund the Guard stemmed more from the governor’s political clout than from the 
implementation of a codified mode of funding.  
Examples like Katrina point to Guard action expressly accomplishing HS 
irrespective of the funding environment within which it operates. Although little language 
explicitly describes DoD activities in homeland security, the DoD nevertheless has a 
substantial role in this doctrinal space. However, DoD activities beyond the scope of HD 
are not automatically classified as HS. The guardsmen who worked the flooded 
intersections after Katrina were executing HS missions. However, DoD doctrine does not 
describe the actions of similarly deployed soldiers operating in the same neighborhoods as 
HS. DoD doctrine allows for action in a supporting role to an HS activity but does not 
define this as HS. Within DoD doctrine, support to an LFA is described as DSCA. The 
following section describes DoD activities in DSCA and lends some insight into the limited 
situations where the Guard accomplishes DSCA. This section also shows the Guard’s 
aptitude for HS missions, as described previously, but does not infer a seamless integration 
into DoD DSCA missions as in HD.  
D. DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES 
To adjudicate the space between HD and HS, the DoD created a doctrinal space 
referred to as defense support to civil authorities (DSCA). As previously discussed, the 
DoD retains jurisdiction and primacy in matters of HD, and the recently created DHS 
serves as the primary agent in matters of HS. However, the HS narrative also acknowledges 
the significant capability and capacity of the DoD and the National Guards in HS matters. 
Additionally, Katrina and countless disaster responses since demonstrate the Guard’s 
ability to accomplish discrete HS actions at the behest of governors, irrespective of the 
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funding. The DoD’s reticence in describing its action as HS is understandable. DSCA 
terminology is deferential to local, state, and tribal civil authorities and honors the tradition 
of civilian leadership over military operations while asserting “support” over any 
implication of “command and control.” Although these motivations create useful 
constraints on the DoD’s occasional action in the homeland, they also limit some of the 
Guards’ inherent advantages and fail to recognize the Guard’s persistent presence in HS 
mission spaces. This section demonstrates how the DoD’s effort to define a space outside 
HD and HS hampers proper action by the National Guards. 
Although the 2018 National Defense Strategy does not provide much domestic 
guidance for the DoD, the White House did publish homeland security guidance in 2007. 
Over a decade old, the National Strategy for Homeland Security reaffirms the purpose of 
USNORTHCOM as a command dually purposed to accomplish homeland defense and civil 
support.112 With respect to DoD participation in the homeland, its most imperative 
language pushes the DoD beyond its top priority of homeland defense. The strategy asserts 
all military components—active duty, reserve, and Guard—must “continue to enhance 
their ability to provide support to civil authorities” in response to the full spectrum of 
manmade and natural disasters.113 
The terms support to civil authorities or civil support are at the center of the 
doctrinal opacity surrounding domestic military operations. Should their appearance in 
homeland-security strategy documents make them synonymous with homeland security 
and each other? Given that a search of the DHS website yields no definition of homeland 
security, the answer is probably no. In this vein, the DoD’s joint doctrine designed to 
differentiate between homeland defense, homeland security, and defense support to civil 
authority leads with a clear warning that they “are not interchangeable.”114 This strict 
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language from the 2013 DSCA doctrine is softer in the 2018 update but still draws lines of 
demarcation with a caution that the three doctrinal spaces “are distinct operations.”115 
While DoD doctrine makes an effort to separate these mission areas, they are not 
as clearly differentiated as one might suppose. The DoD has struggled to provide clear 
guidance since it first published joint doctrine for these mission spaces. The short 
chronology that follows provides some insight into the DoD’s difficulty in describing these 
environments. The doctrinal difficulty for the DoD is compounded when these same 
concepts are applied to the National Guards. The Guards’ ability to operate at the federal 
and state levels, their authorities, and their different funding modes create additional 
dimensions that compound the complexities within these doctrinal demarcations. 
In an effort to shed light on these differentiations, the DoD authored joint doctrine 
not only for homeland defense—Joint Publication 3-27—but also for DSCA—Joint 
Publication 3-28.116 Interestingly, when JP 3-28 was published in 2007, it was titled Civil 
Support and attempted to reconcile and define these terms as an overlapping continuum 
with DoD equities across homeland defense, homeland security, and civil support. The 
2007 doctrine visually describes this overlap, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. 2007 Graphic from JP 3-27 Displaying the Relationships 
between HD, Civil Support, and HS Missions117 
By the time the 2013 revision to JP 3-28 was published, the graphic was moved 
from Civil Support to Homeland Defense, JP 3-27. Here, DoD regulators endeavored to 
reconcile and define these distinctions and overlapping ideas with a full appendix within 
the homeland defense guidance. Appendix A of JP 3-27 begins with the clear recognition 
that legal and jurisdictional considerations create significant hurdles to effective operations 
in the homeland.118 This domestic legal landscape is at the forefront of the doctrinal 
complexity these directives attempt to reconcile and hints at the federalism discussion this 
thesis promotes. The 2013 graphic from JP 3-27 is displayed in Figure 5 for comparison. 
Interestingly, Figures 4 and 5 both allude visually to the original (and flawed) idea that HD 
and DSCA are predominantly subsets in an overarching HS landscape. 
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Figure 5. 2013 Graphic from JP 3-27 Displaying the Relationship 
between HD, HS, and DSCA Missions 119 
In 2018, the DoD published its most recent update to JP 3-28 with the third iteration 
of this graphic, this time proposing that the magnitude of an event is an additional factor 
relating to the interplay between sometimes-overlapping, sometimes-discrete DoD 
activities. The graphic also corrects the inaccurate implication that HD is subsumed under 
HS by providing greater separation between these two spaces (while not completely 
dividing them). Figure 6 provides useful and contemporary insight into the complexity of 
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defining these ideas and their demarcations. DoD efforts to visually interpret this doctrinal 
landscape have continued with each update to domestic guidance. Although these visual 
aids may be imperfect proofs of doctrinal shortfalls, the variance between each iteration 
alludes to the complexity of these mission spaces. 
The legal and jurisdictional considerations referred to in JP 3-27 are at the center 
of this difficulty. At their polar extremes, HD and HS seem well defined: “DoD is 
responsible for the homeland defense (HD) mission” whereas “[DHS] is the lead federal 
agency for HS.”120 However, every iteration of joint doctrine admits that these functions 
can occur simultaneously, or in parallel, and often overlap. 
In basic terms, DSCA refers to a situation in which DoD personnel, equipment, or 
expertise are made available to federal agencies charged with operating in the homeland. 
Although DHS has primacy in matters of homeland security, the DoD still has significant 
and consequential influence, expertise, and resources central to HS effectiveness. More 
emphatically, the DoD’s core domestic strategy highlights the unique attributes of the 
Armed Forces and a consequent expectation of prominence in disaster response roles.121 
Clearly, despite the complexity of its own domestic guidance, the DoD does not want to be 
written out of the domestic mission. 
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Figure 6. Contemporary Representation of HD, DSCA, and HS 
Relationships and Missions122 
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To be fair, the military doctrinarian’s insistence in a third category beyond discrete 
HD or HS contains some wisdom. The DoD and USNORTHOM stand ready to provide 
resources should state forces be overwhelmed but do not want to supersede civil 
authorities.123 Not to confuse or subordinate LFA primacy in matters of HS, the DoD’s 
support to LFAs conducting HS activities is referred to as DSCA. The DoD stands ready 
to provide DSCA at all times but only when asked and for not a moment longer than 
needed.124 To reiterate, even if FEMA describes an action as a homeland security activity, 
military leaders carrying out the activity do not.  
The 2005 hurricane season was an important example of the DoD’s domestic 
action. The DoD was present during Katrina and accomplished DSCA. While the Guard 
response peaked at over 50,000 members, active-duty involvement surged to an equally 
impressive 22,670.125 USNORTHCOM’s Short History describes actions in the homeland 
beyond Katrina and chronicles some of the DoD’s ongoing domestic support. 
USNORTHCOM support included Navy diver support to a 2007 bridge collapse in 
Minneapolis, flood relief to Midwestern states, wildfire support to California, and response 
to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008.126 In 2010, when the Deepwater Horizon drilling 
platform spilled oil across the Gulf, DoD forces moved to provide support, and in 2011, 
the DoD introduced “DSCA from the sea” when it deployed amphibious forces as a 
response to Hurricane Irene. Then in 2012, responding to Hurricane Sandy, which struck 
New York and New Jersey, the DoD complemented the Guard’s response with half of the 
8,000 supporting service personnel.127 Irrespective of the definitions used for non-HD 
action in the homeland, there is no denying the capability and effectiveness of DoD forces 
assisting in domestic disasters.  
In each application of DSCA, the DoD responded to a request for support from a 
lead federal agency. The DoD provides DSCA through a mission assignment process 
                                                 
123 U.S. Northern Command, A Short History of United States Northern Command, 5. 
124 U.S. Northern Command, 5. 
125 House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative, 202. 
126 U.S. Northern Command, A Short History of United States Northern Command, 16. 
127 U.S. Northern Command, 19. 
49 
whereby it completes a work order originating from the affected state’s leadership. The 
following pages describe how the DoD engages in DSCA missions, and Figure 7 is a 
simplified illustration of the major actions associated with DSCA. 
The National Response Framework describes the premise that disaster response 
propagates from the lowest jurisdictional level capable of handling the event.128 As 
community capabilities or capacities are exceeded, resources from neighboring 
communities, the state, neighboring states, and ultimately the federal government can be 
brought to bear. When state capabilities or fiscal resources are constrained, communities 
can submit a request for assistance to an LFA. The DSCA process begins when the LFA 
sources a solution for the state request but another federal agency cannot or is not suited to 
meet the need. FEMA is generally the LFA in a disaster and uses its tasking authority under 
the Stafford Act to issue a mission assignment (MA) to another federal agency.  
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Figure 7. Process Map for Military Forces Accomplishing DSCA 
An MA is a work order that describes the work to be performed, the funding 
authority, and managerial controls for the tasked federal agency.129 The president “can 
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direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement” to make its resources available 
within its legal authorities; however, reimbursement is the norm.130 In this manner, the 
DoD is like any other federal agency, and its DSCA directive reinforces the expectation 
that its supporting activities will be reimbursed.131  
In Figure 7, the sub-process associated with acceptance of the MA has been greatly 
simplified, and a few internal processes within this step are important to note.132 The DoD’s 
DSCA directive describes evaluation criteria to determine whether the MA is appropriate. 
These evaluation criteria include capability, cost, appropriateness, risk, readiness, legality, 
lethality, and time (CCARRLL-T).133 Defense coordinating officers (DCOs) and other 
decision makers in the DoD’s decision tree ensure that the MA complies with the law, does 
not unduly expose DoD members to situations where lethal force may need to be used, and 
does not expose its members to unnecessary safety hazards. Additionally, they screen the 
MA for its impact on the DoD’s budget—whether it is “in the interest of the Department”—
and ensure that it does not detract from primary national security missions.134 The readiness 
consideration, and its potential to detract from the DoD’s primary missions, has become a 
key concern for the DoD and the services. Units sourced from the active or reserve 
components must be unencumbered by commitments associated with global security 
missions. Consequently, MA acceptance and sourcing become almost concurrent activities 
to ensure the DoD has the flexibility and depth in its force pool.  
Unfortunately, these necessary constraints for the DoD’s occasional action in the 
homeland are overly restrictive when applied to the Guard. The Guards have capabilities, 
authorities, and legal freedoms that may not limit the appropriateness of their action, and 
their proximity to most disasters often makes them the timeliest solution. DCOs who reject 
MAs by applying CCARRLL-T under strict active-duty guidelines prematurely disqualify 
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a DSCA mission well suited to the Guard. Additionally, while the graphic illustrates a 
mechanism for the DoD to create depth from the reserves and the Guard, there is little 
precedent for this, not to mention a historical misunderstanding of how to engage the 
reserve components. Burke and McNeil reiterated the recommendations of the 2012 
Reserve Forces Policy Board that challenge the DoD to clarify its instructions and 
procedures, which continue to be barriers to rapid sourcing of the National Guard.135 They 
repeated the challenge that the secretary of defense should work with the National Guard 
Bureau to provide guidance for the Guard in providing DSCA support while conducting 
operations under (federally funded) 32 U.S.C. § 502(f). Six years after the RFPB 
recommendations, there is still a great deal to do in these areas.  
The Guard’s dual nature is the key difficulty in this sourcing discussion. The service 
secretaries have the authority to activate the reserve components, but there are caveats. 
Section 12031(d) of Title 10, U.S. Code, gives the secretary of defense the authority to 
order members of the reserve component to active duty unless they are in the Guard, where 
the consent of the governor is required.136 The deference to the governor’s authority makes 
unilateral DoD tasking impossible. However, this paper tiger could be easily mitigated 
through quick collaboration between the secretary of defense’s staff, National Guard 
Bureau joint staff, and the supporting governor. In a disaster scenario, the governors are 
motivated to make their Guard available for DSCA and especially interested in the 
possibility of federal funding under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f). 
Returning to the DSCA evaluation criteria, cost becomes a significant factor in the 
DoD’s willingness to accept an MA and is a significant barrier to Guard employment. The 
DoD is focused primarily on matters of national defense, which means there are no funds 
requested for or applied to domestic operations. DoD doctrine reminds its domestic 
practitioners that no funds are available to train, equip, or exercise for DSCA operations 
and that these activities must be reimbursed.137 The Stafford Act provides a mechanism for 
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FEMA to reimburse the DoD for DSCA work performed as a part of an MA.138 However, 
such reimbursement does not automatically open the door for Guard action. Although the 
DoD may accept an MA from FEMA, some of the costs associated with Guard employment 
are not reimbursed. Specifically, regular pay and allowances cannot be reimbursed through 
the Stafford Act.139 Because Guard personnel are part-time employees and have to be hired 
for each occasion of domestic support, their pay and allowances (beyond the minimum 
requirement for annual training) are not planned for in the DoD budget and deemed non-
reimbursable through the Stafford Act. This reimbursement limitation may explain why 
the Guard has only been sourced twice since 2001 for DSCA action resulting from FEMA 
mission assignments.140 
The introductions to HD, HS, and DSCA provide insight into how these doctrinal 
spaces fit into the national security landscape and how they are perceived by the DoD. 
However, the practical landscape of military action in HD, HS, and DSCA is dramatically 
different when described from the Guard’s perspective. Hurricane Katrina provides an 
example of Guard personnel operating as local resources, activated at the lowest practical 
levels of government and executing HS missions. From a DoD vantage point, those pure 
HS missions instantly became DSCA when the assistant secretary of defense agreed to 
federally fund their action. However, this position is inaccurate since DoD doctrine 
describes Guard-doing-DSCA as a scenario where the Guard augments the DoD in 
providing support to overwhelmed states. The Katrina example—where National Guard 
soldiers and airmen were present from the beginning—is more indicative of Guard action 
in the homeland. For the Guard, DSCA is an imperfect abstraction that does little more 
than describe federal (DoD) funding of HS action.  
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In the months after 9/11, the threat of terrorism led the DoD to broaden its definition 
of HD. The DoD and Guard accomplished HD activities as they guarded airports and 
patrolled the skies. More recently, DoD and Guard security missions along the border and 
at ports of entry have been defined as DSCA, not as HD. National special security events, 
where military forces support high-profile events like presidential inaugurations, are 
important examples of missions that started off as HD (after 9/11) and are now relatively 
commonplace as DSCA. While the HD, HS, and DSCA definitions attempt to draw 
doctrinal lines, adjudicating their demarcations can be complex and has evolved. Some of 
these tensions have been described in this chapter, but in the following chapters, they are 
explored in greater detail. This conversation reaffirms the role the Guard has in augmenting 
the DoD in HD and DSCA. Ultimately, the discussion concludes that HS is a fundamental 
Guard mission but that changes to policy and legislative action are necessary to facilitate 
action in this space.  
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IV. THE NATIONAL GUARD AS A NATIONAL ASSET 
From the DoD and the Guard’s history and into the present day, guardsmen stand 
ready to augment the active force across the globe and every domain.141 To this end, the 
Army and Air Force service secretaries ensure the reserve components are full and relevant 
participants in national security missions at home and abroad.142 At its core, the DoD’s 
mission is to deter aggression and provide security to the United States.143 The Guard’s 
primary role as a national asset rests in its ability to integrate into the services and to 
augment the Title 10 force in accomplishing these missions. When McNeil and Burke 
studied the practicality of realigning the Guard under DHS, one of their chief concerns was 
the loss of the DoD’s operational reserve.144 These researchers recognized the increasingly 
important role the Guard has assumed as it has transitioned from a strategic reserve—to be 
activated under only the direst of situations—to an operational reserve providing ongoing 
service augmentation.145 The DoD and the services provide equipment for the Guard and 
request training funds to ensure this operational reserve is as capable as the Title 10 forces 
they support.  
Since the DoD acts to support the National Defense Strategy, it follows that Guard 
integration into these strategic objectives is similarly couched in terms of integration into 
and support of projecting lethality. In times of war or while supporting overseas 
contingency operations, National Guard personnel convert from Title 32 status to Title 10 
status and integrate seamlessly into the overseas mission.146 Doubler’s history of the Guard 
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is an exhaustive affidavit of the Guard’s involvement in these operations.147 He recounts 
Guard involvement that predates its significant World War II contributions in Europe and 
the Pacific, and he provides examples through the Cold War up to the conflicts in the 
Balkans and on to the post-9/11 war on terror. His history makes a definitive case for the 
Guard as a national resource with a retrospective salute to its 400 years of continuous 
service and center-stage role in national emergencies.148 
Beyond the Guard’s role in augmenting the services in their global security 
operations, it also has nationally significant roles domestically. As described in the 
previous chapter, the Guard has a clear role in supporting the DoD in HD. Chapter 9 of 
Title 32, U.S. Code, provides a legal basis for this nationally significant role. Lowenberg, 
writing as chairman of the Homeland Security Committee of the Adjutants General 
Association, punctuates this position and applauds this modification to Title 32 to clarify 
the use of the Guard in the homeland.149  
HD, described for the Guard in Title 32, U.S. Code, clearly transcends parochial 
concerns and exemplifies activities with significance to the nation as a whole. Moreover, 
the DoD’s HD doctrine does provide for the eventuality that state governors may have local 
insight into emergencies with national homeland defense implications. This guidance 
provides governors a mechanism for identifying local HD emergencies and requesting 
federal funding to accomplish these missions. In exceptional circumstances, the directive 
Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard lets a governor “submit 
requests for homeland defense activity funding” for planned events.150 The directive even 
includes a letter template, a “sample request for funding,” as one of its enclosures.  
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Both planned and emergency missions have roles for the Guard. Beyond the combat 
air patrol missions discussed earlier, DoD instructions provide a mechanism for integrating 
Guard forces into HD missions and for providing federal funding for these activities. 
Legislators also established specialized Guard units to fill important homeland security 
roles in addition to national defense missions. Modifications to Title 32 and Title 10 of the 
U.S. Code formally codified two nationally significant missions.151 These 1989 and 1998 
modifications provide for both counter-drug units and WMD-CSTs, respectively.152 Both 
provide federal funding for state-controlled Guard personnel accomplishing important 
operational missions within the states while supporting national security objectives. 
Although counter-drug units and CSTs accomplish national security objectives and 
perform activities that span the HD and HS landscape, they are the exception that proves 
the rule in providing clarity to other Guard operations in the homeland. These mission areas 
offer an example of a fiscal and legislative authority that consequentially provides doctrinal 
clarity for the Guard commanders assigned them. Conceived within the U.S. Code, these 
units and their missions have precise guidance that informs the DoD and specifically serves 
the needs of these units but has little applicability to the wider Guard infrastructure.  
The DoD’s instruction to the Guard for HD missions includes specific modes of 
activation and instructions to governors pursuing federal funding. However, these 
examples of clarity are absent in the Defense Support of Civil Authorities directive and in 
The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities.153 Presumably, a 
directive titled The Use of the National Guard for Homeland Security would be similarly 
opaque if it existed. Alas, this directive has never been written. Again, the Guard enjoys 
this clarity in HD because it is subordinate to the guiding instructions in Title 32, U.S. 
Code, chapter 9. 
                                                 
151 32 U.S.C. § 112 (2018) contains guidance for National Guard counter-drug operations. 10 U.S.C. 
§ 12310(c)(1)(A) (2018) contains guidance for reserve component WMD-CSTs.  
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153 Department of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; and Department of Defense, The Use 
of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities, DoD Instruction 3025.22 (Washington, DC: 
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National special security events (NSSEs) are domestic events with growing DoD 
and National Guard involvement and are equally illustrative in this discussion. NSSEs are 
United States Secret Service–led events for which “national significance” is adjudicated in 
advance, where multiple agencies cooperate in security operations, and where the DoD 
makes “specialized units” available.154 NSSEs were initially designed to provide for 
protective measures during presidential inaugurations or summits, State-of-the-Union 
addresses, or high-profile events like the Olympic Games.155 These events are planned 
events in which local resources may be inadequate for the magnitude of the security 
environment and coordination across multiple federal agencies is critical. NSSEs are useful 
examples of emergency management cooperation and shed some light on the effective use 
of National Guard resources. Some emergency planners even refer to NSSEs as “planned 
disasters” because the response, mitigation, and recovery methodologies of NSSEs are 
similar to those of natural (unplanned) disasters. Some specific contemporary examples 
that illustrate the complexity and magnitude of these events include the 2015 Papal visit to 
Philadelphia, the Republican and Democratic National Conventions in 2016, and the 2017 
Boy Scout Jamboree.156  
Despite their national significance, requests for NSSE designation are still bottom-
up requests from the governor to the DHS secretary.157 This process involves a completed 
questionnaire by the host state’s governor and a review by the NSSE working group, which 
makes a recommendation to the DHS secretary for final adjudication. The reviewers look 
at federal participation; dignitary attendance; significance, size, location, and duration of 
the event; media coverage, the threat environment, and the availability of state or local 
resources. NSSEs are planned events and, therefore, imperfect corollaries for natural 
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157 Thomas Landry, “Embracing the Devil: An Analysis of the Formal Adoption of Red Teaming in the 
Security Planning for Major Events” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 28, https://www. 
hsdl.org/?view&did=800934. 
59 
disaster response. They are, nevertheless, illustrative of a state-to-federal dialogue that 
encompasses federalism and funding adjudication. 
Although this thesis assumes doctrinal opacity surrounding Guard operations in the 
homeland, the modifications to Title 32 of the U.S. Code that allow for well-defined HD 
operations and for HS missions like counter-drug and CSTs illustrate a way forward. 
Additionally, NSSEs demonstrate a systematized process of communication between state 
and federal constituents and provide a model for adjudicating state and federal equity in 
disasters. These mission areas are blueprints for clarity, worthy of emulation across broader 
homeland security activities. 
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V. THE NATIONAL GUARD AS A STATE ASSET 
News coverage after most contemporary natural disasters includes images of 
National Guard personnel providing support to the affected communities. During the 
Hurricane Katrina response, a “National Guard vehicle making its way along a flooded 
street was the first sign of institutional authority for stranded citizens.”158 One can imagine 
flood victims taking comfort in the government understanding their plight and sending the 
full might of the most effective and capable military force in the world. The casual observer 
is certain that the government’s camouflaged emissaries will remain on duty for as long as 
it takes normalcy to return. 
Guard historians like Doubler have written extensively about the Guard’s heroism 
fighting America’s wars overseas but constantly reference its hometown role as the 
governor’s homeland security practitioners. Reaffirming the dual nature of the National 
Guard, Title 32 of the U.S. Code prescribes some authorities for the state and outlines how 
governors can independently employ their National Guards. Section 109 of Title 32, U.S. 
Code, which describes the maintenance of other troops, explains situations where a state 
can independently employ its Guard within its own borders.159 This provision allows a state 
governor, designated as the chief executive, the authority to order his Guard to perform 
security, safety, or defense functions within the state. This service is normally referred to 
as state active duty (with the disquieting acronym SAD), whereupon the governor can use 
state funds to activate the Guard in accordance with the constitution of the respective 
state.160 The governor normally delegates the command and control of these forces to the 
adjutant general, the ranking guardsman in each state. Guardsmen are employed in this 
mode, or status, for most small-scale in-state missions. Although governors can access the 
Guard’s federally assigned aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment while their guardsmen 
                                                 
158 National Emergency Management Association, Emergency Management Assistance Compact, 2-6. 
159 32 U.S.C. §§ 101–908 (2018). 
160 The following is an example from the author’s home state: “‘Active state duty’ means duty in the 
active military service of the state under an order of the governor issued pursuant to authority vested in him 
or her by law and while going to and returning from such duty.” Ark. Code Ann. § 12-60-102 (2014). See 
Appendix A for a more in-depth discussion of Guard duty statuses. 
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respond in SAD, they must reimburse the federal government for the use of fungible 
equipment and supplies such as flight hours, fuel, and food stocks.161 When a governor is 
employing Guard personnel and equipment in SAD, he is invariably engaging in local 
homeland security action.  
Governors have used their authority over the Guard for a wide range of activities. 
When natural disasters strike a community, Guard personnel can be ordered to accomplish 
multiple missions including clearing debris from obstructed roadways, providing a security 
presence, transporting potable water, or assisting state agencies in commodity distribution. 
Governors’ authority and discretion in these SAD missions are wide-ranging. These 
missions almost always accomplish local homeland security needs but are not strictly 
confined to this area. For example, in 2015, after a particularly severe snowstorm, the 
governor of Massachusetts used his National Guard to clear away snow.162  
The Guards’ versatility, capability, and capacity make them critical tools in their 
governors’ disaster response portfolios. Most states assign their Guards the responsibility 
of primary support agency for each of their emergency support functions (ESFs), and some 
states have the Guard as an ESF in its own right.163 Additionally, nine state adjutants 
general have supplemental duties as their states’ homeland security advisors, serving as 
chief executives for matters of emergency management and homeland security.164 
When the governors of their states independently employ the Guard in SAD, they 
are engaging in discrete homeland security activities. The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security reaffirms the ideas of federalism and local government authority while 
recognizing that local governments are more attuned to the needs of their affected 
communities and citizenry.165 A governor’s application of guard forces in SAD reinforces 
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164 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2013, II-4. 
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the local-first, bottom-up principle described in the National Response Framework that is 
central to the U.S. homeland security strategy. 
DoD guidance references legitimate civil authority as the root of all domestic action 
and, therefore, subordinates its homeland security action to requests arbitrated through an 
LFA. This has important implications for the Guard because a state normally requests 
federal assistance only after its Guard, responding in SAD, has already been operational in 
the disaster. Unlike homeland security activities at the federal level, SAD missions are not 
organized under the lead federal agency direction of DHS but rather through coordination 
with the state’s internal department of homeland security or office of emergency 
management. This independent action, supporting state aims and accomplishing state 
matters, alludes to the complication in providing doctrinally significant guidance to the 
National Guard. In Figures 3 and 7, which depict graphic representations of HD and DSCA 
sourcing, the federal government sits atop the sourcing flow. The DoD’s authority in HD 
allows it to act independently for these missions, so this preeminent role places it atop the 
HD flow chart. From the DoD’s perspective, action in DSCA is subordinate to a work order 
from a lead federal agency and is similarly enacted near the top of the DSCA flow chart. 
While the DSCA flow chart shown in Figure 7 is useful for the services, it fails to 
acknowledge state and Guard HS activities that occur well in advance of federal 
intervention. The discussion in the following chapter illustrates how DSCA guidance for 
the Guard is disconnected from potentially concurrent and prerequisite HS activities 
supporting the state. 
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VI. DEPLOYING THE NATIONAL GUARD IN NATIONAL 
EMERGENCIES 
The National Response Framework presupposes a conversation describing the 
capability and capacity of a local jurisdiction’s response to an emergency. These factors 
are heavily influenced by the magnitude of the threat and a federalism debate adjudicating 
national or local primacy. When disasters are the result of an attack on the homeland, the 
DoD adds another HD factor for consideration. Emergency managers constantly ask 
themselves, “Who is in charge, and who is paying?”—so the fiscal dimension becomes 
another recurrent and practical consideration. In this chapter, large-scale, complex disasters 
serve as scenarios to navigate these factors. A catastrophic scenario helps draw clearer 
boundaries, peer through the opacity of doctrinal definitions, and provide a litmus test for 
the HD, HS, and federalism conversation.  
A. THE SPACE BETWEEN: NATIONAL GUARD EMPLOYMENT IN A 
LARGE-SCALE, COMPLEX EVENT 
HD, HS, and DSCA actions should be evaluated by applying them to national 
emergency scenarios. Homeland defense seems intuitive in the context of an existential 
threat to the United States such as a ballistic missile threat. Similarly, homeland security is 
easy to identify when it looks like a civilian in a FEMA windbreaker assessing flood 
damage or a state fish-and-wildlife officer conducting search and recovery operations after 
a tornado. Homeland security also seems intuitive during a governor-directed SAD mission 
for the Guard, where a small state matter can be remedied by the appropriate application 
of Guard resources. Local sheriffs and county judges who ask the governor to direct Guard 
high-water vehicles through flooded streets to deliver sandbags and evacuate trapped 
civilians have initiated homeland security missions. However, applying DSCA or HS 
descriptions to Guard action in large-scale, complex disasters is not always so 
straightforward.  
The DoD’s most recent graphic describing relationships among military missions 
in the homeland (from JP 3-28, illustrated in Figure 6) alludes that the magnitude of a 
disaster is important to HD and HS demarcations. As presented, the graphic is deeply 
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flawed in its implication that the largest threats presuppose HD missions. One can envision 
a large-scale natural disaster with no defense implication and whose response will be 
guided by action from DHS and other HS agents. The graphic is useful, however, as the 
magnitude factor hints toward distinctions that are more complicated when resources are 
constrained or when it is unclear whether the response is in support of a state matter or 
national concern.  
The dividing lines between state matters and national (or federal) matters are 
constitutional and legal dialogues that have been at the core of America’s political debate 
since the beginning. This debate has profound implications for homeland security policy. 
A federalism debate related to a ballistic missile threat to a single city on the West Coast 
would be short. An attack of this nature, on even the smallest municipality, is an attack on 
the nation, and HD policy along with DoD primacy captures the narrative.  
HD and HS represent opposite perspectives on federalism. While an HD threat 
manifests as top-down federal jurisdiction and response, the national incident management 
system and response framework both press the idea that HS preparedness and response are 
a bottom-up effort. This contrasts with HD demands that response begins with the local 
incident commander and escalates or expands as resources are exhausted or are 
unavailable. As emergency managers engaged in HS identify the need for greater levels of 
support, they find themselves assessing disasters in terms of increasing national support 
and, consequentially, in terms of increasing national significance. At a certain point in this 
assessment, a governor may petition the federal government for assistance, entreating the 
president to invoke his authority to declare a natural disaster. Such conversations are at the 
very center of state-matter versus federal-matter distinctions.  
Once again, fiscal concerns weigh heavily in the HS conversation. The DoD’s 
DCSA guidance describes Guard participation in the homeland in support of DoD action 
that is concurrently supporting an LFA (normally FEMA). DSCA guidance provides a 
framework through which DoD leaders can make military capabilities available to civilian 
leaders. Although DoD personnel and equipment are primarily resourced and trained to 
accomplish war-fighting functions, there is significant dual-use applicability to these 
assets. A helicopter that is used to transport Navy Seals behind enemy lines can just as 
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easily move meals into a disaster area, pluck stranded civilians from raging rivers, or 
evacuate wounded or displaced civilians. Military trucks designed to ford streambeds 
across the Fulda Gap are equally adept at navigating flooded streets in South Carolina. 
Although it makes sense to make these resources nationally available, the DoD is not 
resourced to accomplish any of these activities. DHS is similarly limited in disaster 
response resources at its disposal but contributes significantly in disasters through the 
power of the purse. DHS has the responsibility of managing the Disaster Relief Fund, 
through which FEMA enables “Federal response to Presidentially-declared major disasters 
and emergencies.”166 This fund demonstrates a federal commitment to emergency response 
in matters of national significance. In 2019, the White House validated this commitment 
by budgeting $6.652 billion for major disasters declared under the Stafford Act.167 
Although this is evidence of a federal commitment to disaster response, this fiscal reality 
also means the DoD relies on reimbursement from these funds when providing DSCA. 
The DoD’s DSCA proposition of a top-down hierarchy of support is theoretically 
useful and accurate from its perspective but is practically incomplete if it is to include the 
Guard. Figure 8 illustrates that federal action is secondary to and at the request of a regional 
civilian authority. Federal action also occurs at the tail end of a priori local- and state-level 
homeland security conversations. From a Guard perspective, the LFA’s position at the top 
of the DSCA hierarchy (see Figure 7) fails to recognize the preexisting HS environment, 
where the Guard is subordinate to and normally operating at the request of a lead state 
agency.168 Figure 8 is a simple illustration of the National Response Framework, describing 
missions that are initially sourced to local resources and then to other state agencies before 
the state Guard is called into action.169 When their own Guards are insufficient for the task, 
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state offices of emergency management can use the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact to bring guardsmen from neighboring states. FEMA resources and the request for 
assistance that results in a mission assignment to the DoD occur after all of this HS activity. 
The National Guard Bureau, recognizing this antecedent space, coined a phrase to describe 
the Guard’s pre-DSCA action in advance of DoD involvement. The National Guard Bureau 
(NGB) has proposed the more inclusive doctrinal domain of National Guard Civil Support 
(NGCS) in an effort to recognize Guard preeminence in the homeland, allude to Guard 
support in HS activities, and retain lines of demarcation between LFA primacy in DSCA 
and DoD primacy in HD.170 
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Figure 8. Sourcing the National Guard and the DoD in Homeland 
Security 
The NGB’s attempt to differentiate Guard action in advance of DSCA does not go 
far enough. NGCS is linguistically useful for Guard practitioners to clarify action that has 
the doctrinal appearance of DSCA but is not directed and funded by the DoD in support of 
a work order from an LFA—a mission assignment. However, the phrase has no basis in 
the U.S. Code nor is it recognized in DoD doctrine—nor does it answer the authority and 
funding challenges associated with the response to nationally significant homeland security 
70 
events. It is apparent that some key factors should influence doctrinarians as they 
contemplate the DSCA or NGCS middle ground beyond HD and the intersection with HS.  
The capability and capacity of a state’s response to an emergency influence the 
doctrinal landscape. These factors depend on the magnitude of the threat, the jurisdictional 
conversation between matters of (homeland) defense and (homeland) security, and the 
federalism debate adjudicating national or local primacy. Additionally, the fiscal 
dimension is a recurring practical consideration. The following section presents a practical 
example that differentiates starkly between these factors while bringing clarity to 
previously opaque doctrinal spaces.  
B. A NEW MADRID SEISMIC ZONE EARTHQUAKE 
While doctrinarians attempt to determine lines of demarcation between HD, DSCA, 
and HS, emergency management practitioners do not debate that military resources from 
the DoD and the National Guards endure as key enablers in the homeland. This is especially 
true at the extreme end of domestic repose. DHS, the DoD, and all levels in the whole-of-
government planning community look to certain planning scenarios as benchmarks with 
which to measure their domestic readiness. The National Strategy for Homeland Defense 
and Defense Support to Civil Authorities makes a planning assumption that the DoD will 
be a significant force provider “during a catastrophic event in the homeland.”171 The 
strategy goes on to describe potential events of a catastrophic nature as follows: 
Any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace attack, power grid 
failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple, 
interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure sectors and causes 
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely 
affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national 
morale, response efforts, and/or government functions.172  
Contemporary domestic planning practitioners have wrestled with this catastrophic 
definition as being too specific. Recently, more inclusive language has described “large-
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scale, complex disasters” as deserving the same consideration as the events described in 
the definition. Whatever phraseology is used, the deputy secretary of defense through the 
strategy is trying to articulate threats to the nation that transcend more localized disasters.  
The threat of an earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) is perhaps 
the most complicated disaster envisioned by state offices of emergency management, DHS, 
the Guard, and DoD planners. In 2009, FEMA and the United States Corp of Engineers 
provided a grant to the Mid-America Earthquake Center to study the effects of a modern-
day earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone.173 Now a decade old, this report still 
serves as a core planning document for state emergency managers charged with preparing 
for a future earthquake event. The center’s report describes an eight-state region that has 
been seismically active for over two millennia involving large earthquakes at intervals of 
400–1,200 years.174 As illustrated in Figure 9, three principle shocks with moment 
magnitudes of 7.5–8.0 occurred on December 16, 1811; January 23, 1812; and February 7, 
1812.175 Years of aftershocks punctuated the spaces between, and some earthquake effects 
rang church bells as far as Washington, DC, and Boston. The Central United States 
Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC), a partnership of agencies concerned with earthquake 
effects in the NMSZ region, proposes the 1811–1812 shocks should not be dismissed as 
historical curiosities. The United States Geological Survey estimates a 25–40 percent 
chance of a 6.0 magnitude or greater earthquake event within the next 50 years and a  
7–10 percent chance of a repeat quake—as in 1812.176 This threat is, therefore, a credible 
risk, worthy of detailed analysis by domestic planners.  
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Figure 9. New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811–1812177 
An NMSZ earthquake is a useful disaster to consider magnitude, federalism, and 
the interplay between HD and HS. This scenario implies additional fiscal considerations 
related to each of these factors. For DoD and Guard doctrinarians, it is an important lens 
through which to view the ideas of HD, HS, and DSCA. The earthquake would span 
multiple states, directly affect four FEMA regions, and have the potential to disrupt 
commerce, power, and communications on a national scale. The scenario blurs normal 
demarcations prescribed by HD and HS and may even challenge core principles from the 
National Incident Management System.  
                                                 
177 Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “New Madrid Seismic Zone,” accessed March 13, 2019, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/New-Madrid-Seismic-Zone. 
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Returning to Figure 6 from the DoD’s 2018 DSCA doctrine, a disaster’s magnitude 
is portrayed as a differentiating factor in how DoD is to provide support. The graphic 
proposes that the very largest disasters transcend matters of HS and move to HD. The 
NMSZ earthquake scenario is the ultimate-of-ultimate domestic disasters. However, it is a 
stretch to automatically categorize an 1811-like earthquake as an HD mission. The graphic 
correctly implies that events of this magnitude are national matters with a top-down 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, even from the DoD’s first-person perspective, it is inappropriate 
to propose that the DoD be the lead agency responding to this event. The nation is not 
under attack, and there is no enemy to defeat. Even at this scale, the response is, for the 
most part, an HS matter.178 
The NMSZ scenario also challenges some of the bottom-up principles central to the 
National Response Framework. While a bottom-up approach to disaster management nods 
toward the proper application of federalism and engages higher levels of government 
support only when needed, it falters in the face of a large-scale, complex disaster like an 
NMSZ earthquake. Local agencies will be immediately overwhelmed, and affected 
communities will compete for scarce national resources. An immediate presidential 
disaster declaration can be assumed, and DHS will have critically important roles in 
coordinating operations across state and regional boundaries. Resource triage, where 
federal actors prioritize support to affected states, is a matter of ongoing debate among 
NMSZ logistics planners and is just one example of top-down disaster management that 
turns the normal National Response Framework rules on their head. 
A modern-day NMSZ earthquake would be a catastrophic event on the scale of the 
secretary of defense’s definition. CUSEC states would be immediately overwhelmed and 
would reach out for assistance through interstate mutual aid agreements like the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact and requests for assistance to the federal government. 
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Planners calculating the state-to-state movement of Guard resources estimate that 132,000 
Guard personnel would need to be activated.179 In 2019, USNORTHCOM, FEMA, the 
CUSEC states, the National Guard Bureau, and several state National Guards will 
participate in a large-scale exercise to validate these numbers. Additionally, the hope of 
this exercise is to describe how large the DoD response would likely be. Significant DoD 
involvement is expected, thus adding to the 132,000 identified Guard personnel. 
The NMSZ earthquake, unlike other disaster scenarios, firmly places the 
conversation within a national context whose complexity applies to this thesis. A core 
conversation associated with the NMSZ relates to funding. As described previously, an HD 
threat is automatically considered a national threat and enables the DoD’s federal funding 
of guardsmen. Most planners involved in the detailed response planning for an NMSZ 
earthquake would agree that the scenario is catastrophic on a national scale. However, 
unlike Guard action supporting HD, the DoD has no mechanism to fund the Guard 
supporting a national HS threat like an NMSZ earthquake. Even if legislators worked with 
the secretary of defense to directly fund the DoD for NMSZ operations, Guard actions 
subordinate to the DoD are an awkward and impractical doctrinal rigidity divorced from 
the reality of the Guard’s persistent HS presence. 
While DSCA is an inappropriate doctrinal space for the Guard response to an 
NMSZ earthquake, FEMA and DoD planners point to Guard action in SAD as a solution. 
The Guards in SAD are definitively engaged in HS, and governors can petition FEMA for 
access to Stafford Act disaster funding to offset costs incurred (including SAD pay and 
allowances). In this example, federal fiscal resources from the Disaster Relief Fund are 
made available through the Stafford Act, the line between HD and HS is clearly 
adjudicated, and the state and federal executives have a mechanism for engaging in 
dialogue about and adjudicating matters of federalism. Guard action in SAD seems to 
resolve the doctrinal difficulties described throughout this thesis.  
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Although Guard action in SAD is doctrinally differentiated and reconciles 
federalism, the magnitude, and HD–HS demarcations, it has practical challenges that make 
it an imperfect solution for the NMSZ earthquake scenario.180 SAD activations at this scale 
involve separate independent payroll actions from each state involved. The administrative 
burden involved in seeking reimbursement is beyond the capacity of most individual states 
and will be a crushing burden for FEMA. In the 2017 hurricane season, 40 state National 
Guards deployed over 9,000 guardsmen to Texas, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.181 
Although most of these 40 states managed the fiscal and administrative burden of these 
deployments, it took more than a year for some of these accounting processes to finally 
reconcile. This disaster season was the most destructive to date, eclipsing Katrina, but was 
still a minor operation compared to the scale of a major NMSZ earthquake.182 From a 
purely fiscal perspective, an NMSZ earthquake will create a $19.8 million daily 
expenditure for Guard payroll actions alone.183 Guard planners from the CUSEC states 
estimate reimbursement operations will not be able to keep pace with expenditures related 
to an NMSZ earthquake, causing state-level fiscal insolvency within days of a significant 
shock.  
This thesis proposes that an NMSZ earthquake provides a doctrinal lens to clarify 
Guard action in the homeland. For a massive, multi-state NMSZ earthquake the Guard will 
be the largest government entity involved. Whether it operates in SAD or in Title 32, 
federally funded, governor-controlled status, its actions are a national matter. With an 
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182 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, July 12, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1533643262195-6d1398339449ca85942538a1249d2ae9/2017FEMAHurricaneAARv20180730.pdf. 
This source contains multiple references to measures of comparison between the 2017 season and 
Hurricane Katrina.  
183 Guard planners use a $150 daily rate as an approximation for SAD payroll. 
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assumed presidential declaration, either status will ultimately be federally funded—as SAD 
payroll will be reimbursed through the Disaster Relief Fund. Despite the assertion that 
these two courses of action are federally funded federal actions in the same HS mission 
space, DoD doctrine forces arbitrary separation. While in SAD, the Guard will be engaged 
in HS; however, the DoD has no mechanism to describe its own action in HS, and DSCA 
inadequately describes the Guard’s catastrophic disaster response in Title 32 status. For 
disasters of this scale, Title 32 status resolves administration challenges—the guard 
activates, deploys, pays, and deactivates guardsmen once a month, every month—and 
ensures state fiscal solvency. However, this status concurrently places the DoD in a 
position of funding an operation it did not anticipate fiscally and may limit what expenses 
can be reimbursed through the Stafford Act. The Guard needs a doctrinal space where it 
accomplishes national matters in a Title 32 status, is not subordinate to a DoD mission 
assignment (DSCA), and does not become a fiscal drain on the DoD’s HD or overseas 
obligations. Inconsistencies like these point to the need for an updated doctrine that is adept 
at serving the nation during large-scale, complex disasters in the homeland. The NMSZ 
scenario highlights the need for a doctrinal space that describes the National Guard in a 
federally funded, state-controlled, Title 32 status accomplishing HS activities. The next 
chapter examines short-term and ultimately more enduring strategies to correct these 
identified doctrinal inconsistencies and resolve competing fiscal tensions. 
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VII. CLARIFYING THE NATIONAL GUARD’S ROLE IN 
HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES 
Earlier chapters described the HD, HS, and DSCA landscape for the DoD and 
illustrated the current modes of National Guard integration into and alongside the DoD in 
these mission areas. These mission spaces were considered in the context of national or 
local implications and their influence on DoD and Guard response in large-scale, complex 
disasters. From this conversation, it is apparent that clear language within the U.S. Code 
has enabled clear action within HD and within some select mission areas attributed to the 
Guard. It is also clear that fiscal considerations lie beneath the surface of every doctrinal 
consideration and result from federalism debates. This chapter provides solutions aimed at 
clarifying National Guard roles in HS and DSCA. It explores the limitations within Title 
32, “National Guard,” and Title 42, “The Public Health and Welfare.” The limitations to 
Guard action under Title 32 authorities and reimbursement restrictions in the Stafford Act 
under Title 42 need to be resolved for enduring solutions to Guard action in the homeland.  
A. ENABLING GUARD ACTION: SHORT-TERM SOLUTIONS 
To better facilitate Guard action in the homeland, doctrine needs to be amended or 
added. Ultimately, these doctrinal improvements should originate in legislation, but some 
short-term solutions should be pursued in the interim. The DoD abandoned efforts to create 
a stand-alone doctrine for HS in 2009, and although there is significant HS discussion in 
Homeland Security and Defense Support to Civil Authorities, these rightfully focus on DoD 
action in the homeland, not National Guard action. The previous DSCA discussion showed 
that there is little precedence for the Guard accomplishing DSCA; it is almost fiscally 
impossible and ignores the bottom-up premise of the National Response Framework. 
Moreover, the DoD asserts that neither it nor Congress has the legal authority to appropriate 
funding for the governors’ use of their Guards. These barriers and inconsistencies lead to 
the conclusion that DSCA doctrine is an inadequate guide for guardsmen operating in the 
homeland. In advance of clear, legislative guidance for Guard action in large-scale, 
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complex disasters, DoD and DHS leaders must look for modes to augment DoD funding 
in disasters and ways to adjudicate between federal and state equities.  
Reiterating the DoD’s lack of funding for HS and DSCA missions, doctrinal 
improvements will still be at the mercy of fiscal constraints within the DoD’s budget. An 
emergency afflicting the nation transcends treatment as purely a state matter, and the DoD 
must have a mechanism to fund the Guard. In the same way that Homeland Defense 
Activities Conducted by the National Guard instructs governors and senior military leaders 
in matters of HD, new guidance should be instructive for nationally significant matters of 
HS and DSCA while providing fiscal solutions. There is clearly room for a new 
complementary directive called Homeland Security Activities Conducted by the National 
Guard. 
Lowenberg wrote of the important modifications to Title 32 and the implications of 
the “other duty” allowed in 32 U.S.C. § 502(f). Nevertheless, National Guard leaders 
continue to experience difficulty in accessing federal funding, which is implicit in Title 32, 
chapter 5, to accomplish disaster response activities. After the 2017 hurricane season, 
senior leaders in the National Guard Bureau looked for creative solutions for employing 
Guard personnel in current authorities that were not shackled by ambiguous DoD guidance. 
Without running afoul of the training mandates in the U.S. Code, NGB leaders looked for 
avenues to federally fund Guard response. The chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) 
sought to clarify existing guidance that gives the adjutants general discretion in using 
training funds. He reminded them that training activities could have a secondary benefit 
including actions in response to domestic disasters.184 Here, the CNGB provided guidance 
to Guard commanders by reminding them that activities accomplished to achieve service 
“warfighting” objectives could have incidental operational benefits for their state when the 
training coincided with a disaster or other planned event. Nevertheless, adjutants general 
have to be cautious and deliberate in how they exercise this authority, as these training 
                                                 
184 Joseph Lengyel and Michael Taheri, Guidance Regarding Authority to Conduct Training during 
National Guard Civil Support (NGCS) Operations for Domestic Disaster Response (Arlington, VA: 
National Guard Bureau, September 14, 2018). 
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funds are distributed primarily by the services to accomplish their national security—not 
disaster response—objectives. 
A discussion of the legal authorities behind the funds for Guard actions in the 
homeland helps to explain the services’ distribution of training funds. Title 32, U.S. Code, 
is the source document for most of these authorities. Chapter 5 specifically describes 
training activities for the Guard. The 1964 revisions to the code have had important 
implications for domestic Guard employment. Differentiating between the authorities in 
the modern U.S. Code is still a matter of debate, but a good working example is summarized 
briefly in Table 1 and explained more fully in Appendix A. This table shows how the 
CNGB’s guidance clarifies the application of training authorities and funding in the U.S. 
Code, specifically the ability to provide “an incidental operational benefit.”185 This 
guidance better defines the “other duty” Lowenberg references. It proposes that events—
such as natural disasters—could provide meaningful, necessary training for wartime 
readiness while benefitting state governors and providing adjutants general with clearer 
guidance on their authority to repurpose local funds under U.S. Code authority.  
  
                                                 
185 Lengyel and Taheri, Authority to Conduct Training. The NGB is currently in the process of writing 
the 2019 Guidance and Authority for the use of Title 32 Training with Incidental Operational Support, but 
this guidance was still in draft form at the time of this paper’s publication. 
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The justification presupposes (warfighting) training value commensurate with the 
goals of 32 U.S.C. § 502(a). While this clarifying language is valuable, DoD and Guard 
participation in disaster response is still an unanticipated requirement beyond the services’ 
normal budget.187 Subsection (f) does not create new disaster funding but provides latitude 
within existing training guidance and broader authorities within the existing budgetary 
allocation. Clearly the CNGB’s guidance needs to be taken further to ensure this fiscal 
impasse does not restrain military support in disasters. 
The CNGB’s guidance is, nevertheless, valuable. DoD and Guard comptrollers are 
well versed in submitting out-of-cycle requests to cover unfunded or unanticipated events. 
For example, the DoD submitted a multi-billion-dollar supplemental budget request in 
2017 that included a wide range of requirements, from additions to overseas campaigns to 
                                                 
186 DoDI 1215.06 and DoDI 3025.22 are silent on the distinction between 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(1) and § 
502(f)(2) despite these distinctions in the U.S. Code. According to a 2019 primer produced by the National 
Guard Bureau, the “President and the SecDef have authority to authorize operational missions under 32 
U.S.C. §502(f)(2).” This legal primer also describes DSCA by proposing that the “DOD 3025 series of 
publications govern providing DSCA to a qualifying entity and primarily apply to response under Title 10 
and 32 U.S.C. §502(f)(2).” Rofrano, 2019 Domestic Operations Law and Policy, 219. Although the 
previous reference implies the CNGB has authority to approve § 502(f)(1), considerable debate that refutes 
this position has not been resolved at the time of this writing.  
187 Department of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2013, E-4. 
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unanticipated activities including repairs to storm-damaged military infrastructure.188 It 
follows that Guard personnel pressed into duty to accomplish nationally significant 
homeland security activities—beyond the services’ initial budgetary estimates—could use 
supplemental funding measures in years where natural disasters strain the DoD’s budget. 
In advance of modifications to the Stafford Act or Title 32, U.S. Code, homeland 
security administrators must be able to supplement the DoD’s budget in times of disaster. 
After 9/11, with a focus on prosecuting the war on terror, Congress proposed the Defense 
Emergency Response Fund (DERF) as a means to supplement homeland security funding 
for the DoD.189 Appendix D of this thesis chronicles some significant events associated 
with this fund. DERF was an effective tool for providing the DoD with fiscal elasticity. 
Unfortunately, DERF’s purpose was tied too closely to counterterrorism activities, and it 
was rarely used to defray the costs of disasters. The fund has been discontinued and DERF 
references removed from DoD guidance. Nevertheless, as defense comptrollers consider 
budgetary targets for future defense appropriations, an allocation to a DERF-like line of 
accounting would provide a mechanism to federally fund National Guard actions in the 
homeland. As legislators consider future national defense authorization acts, there is an 
opportunity to resurrect DERF or define a substitute better able to reimburse DoD and 
Guard domestic actions.  
In addition to the short-term funding solutions proposed, NSSEs provide a model 
for engaging in adjudication conversations critical to DoD and Guard action in the 
homeland. The United States Secret Service developed questionnaires and checklists that 
allow state executives an opportunity to engage in structured deliberation on matters of 
federal and state equity. These conversations clarify the level of federal participation 
anticipated and draw distinctions based on the event size, location, duration, threat 
                                                 
188 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Request for Additional FY 2017 
Appropriations: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, March 16, 2017), 3, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/ 
defbudget/fy2017/marchAmendment/FY17_March_Amendment.pdf. 
189 Government Accountability Office, Defense Budget: Tracking of Emergency Response Funds for 
the War on Terrorism, GAO-03-346 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, April 30, 
2003), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-346. 
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environment, and the availability of state or local resources. Intuitively, similar 
differentiating criteria could adjudicate the line between state and federal matters in natural 
disasters. These new criteria would become prerequisites for state executives, the DoD, 
and DHS to access National Guard capabilities under appropriate funding and authorities. 
Despite the DoD’s fiscal constraints in matters of HS and in the absence of a mode 
of dialogue adjudicating federal or state matters, there is some precedent for resolving both 
of these challenges. DoD, DHS and National Guard leaders must work to develop 
clarifying guidance aimed at piercing these obstacles to domestic action. The CNGB is 
working to create interim guidance relating to “incidental support.” There are existing 
models to augment DoD appropriations, and the Secret Service has one to adjudicate 
whether an event has a federal nexus. All of these examples point toward short-term 
collaboration that could significantly improve and facilitate Guard action during large-
scale, complex disasters.  
B. ENABLING GUARD ACTION: ENDURING SOLUTIONS 
Beyond matters of federalism and doctrinal HS and HD demarcations, fiscal 
considerations permeate all disaster conversations. A major obstacle to employing the 
Guard in large-scale disasters stems from the inability to federally fund its activation. 
Guard personnel serve the military as part-time employees, so any activation beyond their 
core warfighting training needs external funding. The pay and allowances of activated 
Guard personnel accomplishing HS are unplanned appropriations outside the DoD’s 
normal budget. Additionally, the DoD cannot seek reimbursement for pay and allowances 
through appeals to the Stafford Act. Guard activation in SAD is doctrinally clean but 
produces crushing administrative challenges, creates disparity in responder benefits, and 
might bankrupt states responding to nationally significant, catastrophic disasters. Clearly, 
more enduring fiscal solutions are needed. 
Recent modifications to Title 32 of the U.S. Code to clarify the Guard’s action in 
HD serve as a model worth emulating and a means to solving the funding challenges with 
Guard action. Sections 901–908 of Title 32, U.S. Code, provide legal and financial 
guidelines for Guard action in matters of HD. Revisions to 32 U.S.C. §112 have similarly 
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informed National Guard counter-drug operations while revisions to 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c) 
have enabled National Guard WMD-CSTs. Specialized teams like these, distributed 
throughout the states, have similarly instructive legal and financial authority guiding their 
actions in a broad range of HD and HS missions.  
Title 10 of the U.S. Code requires that the DoD develop a plan for funding 
capabilities.190 The secretary of defense must provide the funds and resources necessary to 
employ the active components and the reserve components in HD, domestic emergency 
response, and “military support to civil authorities.”191 However, because Congress does 
not appropriate funds for the DoD to accomplish disaster response operations, the secretary 
of defense must fund operations with an empty purse. This imperative should be pressed 
further, and the language in Title 10 and Title 32 of the U.S. Code needs to be further 
refined to provide greater clarity for the Guard. The CNGB should not have to interpret 
U.S. Code to enable Guard action. Title 32 must be modified to explicitly reference the 
Guard acting under the authority prescribed in § 502(f) and supporting nationally 
significant HS actions. This new language should serve as the basis for revisions to DoD 
doctrine, open the door to stand-alone HS doctrine relating to Guard action, and drive 
improvements to DoD instructions and directives. Furthermore, from a practical 
perspective, this improvement would empower the DoD to include an annual appropriation 
for the federally funded burden of Guard personnel acting within these mission areas. 
  
                                                 
190 10 U.S.C. § 1815(a)–(d) (Supp. V 2006). 
191 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2018). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Working with the Nation’s Governors and State Adjutants General, the 
Department of Defense must develop operational plans based upon the 
national planning scenarios that will integrate and synchronize military 
forces to achieve unity of effort in support of homeland security missions 
across the Nation. These plans will determine specific military requirements 
and capabilities for accomplishing homeland security missions that will 
most effectively be met by the combined effort of active, reserve, and 
National Guard forces. 
 —Homeland Security Council192 
 
On October 27, 2018, the director of operations for United States Indo-Pacific 
Command set in motion a conversation that would lead to employment of National Guard 
personnel in DSCA to support response and recovery efforts in the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands after it was struck by Super Typhoon Yutu.193 One hundred and 
thirty Guam National Guard personnel were sourced and received secretary of defense 
approval to respond in federal pay status under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2). They were approved 
to support USINDOPACOM and FEMA for a period of 30 days. This activation resulted 
from a conversation between FEMA, the DoD, and Guam’s Governor, Eddie Baza Calvo, 
in which Calvo consented for Guam National Guard personnel to provide support in a Title 
32, federally funded, state-controlled duty status. This response to a natural disaster in the 
Northern Marianas was a small but illustrative step toward practically defining Guard 
action in the homeland.  
The important role the DoD and the National Guard have in the homeland remains 
indisputable. Both institutions are inextricably linked, and the sum of their combined parts 
is significantly more capable than any one part alone. Military doctrine must be explicit in 
                                                 
192 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 51. 
193 Robert Brown, “Request for Activation of 9th Mission Support Command U.S. Army Reserve and 
Guam U.S. Army National Guard Soldiers under 12304a Mobilization Authority in Accordance with DoDI 
1235.12, June 7, 2016” (official memorandum, Ft. Shafter, HI: U.S. Army Pacific Command, October 27, 
2018). 
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the modes of cooperative and unified planning and serve as an effective guide in 
accomplishing homeland security missions. To this end, the DoD has taken pains to 
produce and refine doctrine that guides the actions of the active services and the Guard. 
However, the doctrine suffers where it has to serve the federal and state natures of the 
National Guard, and continued refinement is necessary. 
Large-scale, complex natural disaster planning should press military doctrinarians 
to consider how federalism plays into response. These scenarios should challenge DHS, 
DoD, and Guard planners to consider which threats to the United States are parochial 
concerns and which ones are national matters. The DoD’s primacy in homeland defense is 
uncontested, and clear doctrinal roadmaps point to fiscal, legal, and jurisdictional 
authorities supporting quick and seamless integration of Guard personnel. The governors’ 
authority in accomplishing HS actions in their states is comparably efficient. The Stafford 
Act, adjudicated through DHS and FEMA, provides a mechanism for these state governors 
and federal decision-makers to debate demarcations between state and federal (fiscal) 
matters. Governors and their emergency managers can use the disaster declaration process 
to initiate a state-to-federal dialogue that results in cost-sharing between the state and the 
federal government. When applicable, governors can even apply these fiscal equities to the 
cost of placing their Guard soldiers and airmen on state active duty. Current doctrine and 
state laws are useful at these extremes—a federally funded Guard supporting the DoD in 
matters of HD or a state-funded Guard supporting HS—but fail in some of the grey areas 
in between.  
DSCA is an action in which the DoD provides support to an LFA supporting HS. 
The LFA’s jurisdiction in this doctrinal space implies support of a nationally significant 
nature. However, despite several arguments supporting Guard preeminence in matters of 
HS, guardsmen cannot be accessed because the DoD is not funded to source the Guard in 
this mission space. The DoD is also unable to access disaster funding from the Stafford 
Act to reimburse it for unplanned DSCA assistance from the Guard. Moreover, the doctrine 
is understandably loath to encroach on the governors’ authority over the state Guards while 
silent on modes of dialogue and coordination that could result in cooperation between state 
and DoD planners accomplishing HS or DSCA actions. If the Guard is to be a practical 
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partner of the DoD in DSCA or empowered to conduct federally funded HS independent 
of DoD action, then refinement to the Stafford Act or disaster lines of accounting within 
the DoD budget must be considered. If practical, there is a solid argument for mission 
assignments from an LFA directly to the National Guard. Legal accounting mechanisms 
like DERF could serve as effective disaster response tools and provide the DoD with fiscal 
elasticity. Additionally, DSCA—Guard action subordinate to DoD mission assignments—
is too narrow to accommodate operations like the Katrina response, where the Guard 
accomplished governor-directed, governor-controlled HS in a federally funded, Title 32 
status. The DoD’s lack of authority over the non-federalized Guard should serve as a 
doorway to federal and state dialogue and not be seen as an insurmountable legal barrier. 
NSSE missions presuppose an adjudicating conversation between lead federal agencies, 
the DoD, and the National Guard and provide a model for similar conversations aimed at 
adjudicating HS, HD, and DSCA. Ultimately, new legislation will facilitate new doctrine 
that must provide clear guidance to state adjutants general, the NGB, and the services for 
how to enter into these conversations and aid in better sourcing Guard resources for large-
scale, complex disasters.  
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APPENDIX A.  NATIONAL GUARD DUTY STATUSES 
National Guard duty statuses are important considerations for action in the 
homeland. Table 2 and the pages that follow provide insight into Guard duty statuses and 
their legal differences. Although status is central to understanding the National Guard, this 
discussion is included here not to distract from the central debate relating to HD, HS, and 
DSCA doctrine. Readers familiar with these legal statuses can dismiss this section, but it 
is included for readers who are unfamiliar with these demarcations or terms. Although 
secondary to the doctrinal focus of this paper, there are several characteristics of state active 
duty that make this status problematic in large-scale, complex disasters. These matters 
often distract from the doctrinal concerns this paper proposes but cannot be discounted as 
inconsequential to the practical application of Guard forces. These complications are also 
addressed in this appendix.  




                                                 
194 Adapted from John Maier, “A Legal Foundational Understanding on the Dual Status Commander & 
Domestic JTFs” (presentation, Dual-Status Commander Course, Arlington, VA, October 14, 2016). 
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A. TITLE 10 STATUS 
Title 10, “Armed Forces,” of the U.S. Code governs the management of military 
forces in general. Title 10 status, in the context of the Guard, refers to the Guard’s ability 
to be federalized to accomplish national security objectives. Title 10 contains provisions 
that allow the president to assume control of members of the Guard and legally integrate 
them into the active-duty standing military force. When Guard members are deployed 
overseas to serve in contingency operations, they become members of the Title 10 force 
and are legally and practically indistinguishable from the standing military force.  
B. TITLE 32 STATUS 
Title 32 of the U.S. Code governs the management of the National Guard. The code 
lays out the Guard’s organization, administration, training, and procedures for aligning 
with the services. Although these aspects are relatively small portions of U.S. Code, these 
few sentences provide the framework within which guardsmen must operate and determine 
how they are funded, whether conducting normal training activities or responding to natural 
disasters.  
National Guardsmen are for the most part “citizen soldiers” who hold regular 
civilian roles in the community and who maintain a level of training and readiness through 
periodic training mobilizations.195 Section 502 of Title 32, U.S. Code, describes this 
periodic training as well as determines how guardsmen are to be used in support of civil 
disturbance or natural disasters. Section 502 begins with direction on what kind of training 
to accomplish and how often it should occur. Under § 502(a) guardsmen “assemble for 
drill and instruction . . . at least 48 times each year” and “participate in training at 
encampments, maneuvers, outdoor target practice, or other exercises, at least 15 days each 
year.”196 
                                                 
195 There are full-time guardsmen for the purpose of “organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, 
or training the reserve components.” 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(6)(a) (2018). These AGRs, so named because they 
serve “Active Guard and Reserve duty,” perform full-time National Guard duty under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) 
(2018). Although they are important to the administration of the National Guard, this force is normally 
small compared to the total Guard rolls. See definitions in Annex A. 
196 32 U.S.C § 502(a)(1)–(2) (2018). 
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Section 502(a) legally authorizes the funding of planned National Guard training. 
Two sentences describe reserve duty, which guardsmen accomplish “one weekend a 
month, and two weeks every summer.” In accordance with “regulations to be prescribed 
by the [Service] Secretary,” National Guardsmen maintain a level of readiness necessary 
to fight alongside the regular, Title 10 force in operations across the globe.197 When the 
Services allocate a budget for the National Guard, the majority of the appropriation is set 
aside under “502(a).” It is worth stressing that the services appropriate these training funds 
primarily to meet their (federal) readiness objectives, not to accommodate state 
requirements nor to prepare for civil support.198  
Section 502 of Title 32, U.S. Code, outlines two overarching authorities that 
prescribe activities to which guardsmen lend support. First, two sentences in § 502(a), as 
previously described, relate to normal training necessary for continuous readiness. The 
direction to employ these funds in the name of training has the force of law. National Guard 
commanders and their legal counselors strenuously avoided deviations from the training 
intent of this section.199 Second, § 502(f) “authorizes funds originally programmed for 
training to be utilized for emergency situations,” which is where a great deal of 
misunderstanding occurs regarding the use of the National Guard.200  
As they relate to disaster response, two subcomponents of section 502(f) require 
careful examination. First, 502(f)(1) reads, “Under regulations to be prescribed by the 
                                                 
197 32 U.S.C. § 502 (2018). 
198 There are two noteworthy exceptions when providing support to disasters. The first are operations 
that are “incidental to training.” If a guardsmen were to conduct an operation directly connected to their 
required federal training, this training could support operational (disaster response) needs. For example, a 
flight crew might need to log a certain number of flight training hours and, while completing this training, 
find themselves “incidentally” transporting needed humanitarian aid. Second, exceptions are allowed for 
Immediate Response Authority (IRA), which is a National Guard version of the “Good Samaritan Law,” 
ensuring that guardsmen do not stand idly by under the restrictions of 502(a) when immediate and 
requested support could save life or property. See Appendix A for the definition of IRA.  
199 Commanders must be careful not to take action contrary to the intent of an appropriation and cause 
an anti-deficiency act. Specifically, “An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the 
District of Columbia government may not make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an 
amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation.” 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) 
(2018). 
200 Greg Wingard and Eric McElwain, “Title 32 U.S.C § 502 Funding Authorizations,” National Guard 
Bureau, September 26, 2017. 
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[Secretaries] a member of the National Guard may . . . be ordered to perform training or 
other duty in addition to that prescribed under subsection [502(a)].”201 Second, § 502(f)(2) 
clarifies, “The training or duty ordered to be performed under paragraph (1) may include 
support of operations or missions . . . at the request of the President or Secretary of 
Defense.”202 
An understanding of Title 32 duty status depends on these four core authorities (see 
Table 3, a repeat of Table 1). Section 502(f)(1) provides a mechanism whereby training 
funds can be used for activities outside the training strictures of § 502(a). If authorized, a 
state can use § 502(f)(1) authority to support an event, but the activity must primarily 
accomplish a training objective, and National Guard involvement must be only incidentally 
beneficial to the event. This provision essentially acknowledges that events (such as 
responding to a natural disaster) could occur that provide meaningful training necessary to 
wartime readiness while also benefitting the state. Governors and the adjutant generals can 
petition the service secretaries and the chief of the National Guard Bureau, who are the 
clearinghouse for these state requests and who have the authority to approve a state’s 
requests to repurpose funds to § 502(f)(1) authority. There are numerous examples of 
approval for repurposing funds and the performance of activities under § 502(f)(1). Some 
of the most customary provisions are for national special security events.203 However, this 
approval is normally merely to repurpose existing funds and does not necessarily imply 
that extra funding is available to the state. The justification, by its very nature, presupposes 
training value commensurate with the goals of § 502(a). As “disaster relief participation is 
an unprogrammed requirement for the Services for which funds have not been budgeted,” 
neither the services nor the Guard is resourced to fund unexpected disasters.204 For these 
                                                 
201 32 U.S.C § 502(f)(1) (2018). More explicitly, 502(f)(1)(A) orders the member without his consent 
but with pay while 502(f)(1)(B) requires his consent either with or without pay. 
202 32 U.S.C § 502(f)(2)(A) (2018). 
203 A national special security event is “an event of national significance as determined by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. These national or international events, occurrences, contests, activities, or 
meetings, which, by virtue of their profile or status, represent a significant target, and therefore warrant 
additional preparation, planning, and mitigation efforts. The USSS, FBI, and FEMA are the federal 
agencies with lead responsibilities for NSSEs; other federal agencies, including DoD, may provide support 
to the NSSE if authorized by law.” 32 C.F.R. § 183.3 (2013). 
204 Department of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2013, E-4. 
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reasons, approval normally results in moving training funds to § 502(f) in what amounts to 
a zero-sum accounting exercise.  




Whereas § 502(f)(1) specifically prescribes training aimed at supporting service 
objectives, § 502(f)(2) does not. With a governor’s consent, the president of the United 
States and secretary of defense can order guardsmen to perform duty for a federal mission, 
per § 502(f)(2). Although defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is often used to 
describe a multitude of National Guard activities, the use of the National Guard in DSCA 
expressly means the use of the National Guard under § 502(f)(2).206 
These situations normally arise when the DoD has an interest of its own and needs 
National Guard assistance. In 2015, for example, the Department of the Army sought 
assistance to secure the crash site of the Army’s Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense 
                                                 
205 Although the graphic implies the CNGB has authority to approve § 502(f)(1), considerable debate 
refuting this position has not been resolved at the time of this writing. 
206 “Except as specified otherwise, reference to DoD use of the National Guard for DSCA refers to use 
of the National Guard pursuant to section 502(f)” but does not apply to “National Guard training activities 
that are conducted in a duty status pursuant to section 502(a) or 502(f).” This rules out § 502(a) and 
§ 502(f)(1) from the definition of DSCA. Department of Defense, Use of the National Guard for Defense 
Support, 1–2. 
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Elevated System. The secretary of defense directed the Pennsylvania National Guard to 
provide support under § 502(f)(2) and the Department of the Army to reimburse the 
National Guard for this work.207 
This discussion describes some key points in 32 U.S.C. § 502 and helps to explain 
the funding and status of the National Guard. When operating domestically, funding for 
the National Guard is specifically intended for training aimed at improving wartime 
readiness. There are some mechanisms to support other operational requirements (such as 
disaster response), but these mechanisms may not result in reimbursement to the National 
Guard for costs incurred. 
C. STATE ACTIVE DUTY 
Reaffirming the dual nature of the National Guard, Title 32 also prescribes some 
authorities to the state and outlines how the state can independently employ its National 
Guard. Section 109, “Maintenance of Other Troops,” describes situations in which a state 
can “use its National Guard or its defense forces . . . within its borders in time of peace.” 
Additionally, the states “may, as provided by its laws, organize and maintain defense 
forces. A defense force established under this section may be used within the jurisdiction 
concerned, as its chief executive (or commanding general in the case of the District of 
Columbia) considers necessary.”208 
This provision allows state governors, designated as chiefs executive, the authority 
to order their National Guards to perform functions within the states outside the strictures 
referenced in § 502. This service is normally referred to as state active duty, whereupon 
the governor can use state funds, in accordance with the constitutions of their respective 
states, to activate the Guard.209 The governor normally delegates the command and control 
of these forces to the adjutant general, who is the ranking guardsman of each state. National 
                                                 
207 Lowenberg, Role of the National Guard. 
208 32 U.S.C. §109 (2018). 
209 The following is an example from the author’s home state: “‘Active state duty’ means duty in the 
active military service of the state under an order of the governor issued pursuant to authority vested in him 
or her by law and while going to and returning from such duty.” Ark. Code Ann. § 12-60-102 (2014).  
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Guardsmen are employed in this mode, or status, for most small-scale, in-state missions. 
Although governors can access the Guard’s federally assigned aircraft, vehicles, and other 
equipment while their guardsmen respond in SAD, they must reimburse the federal 
government for the use of fungible equipment and supplies such as flight hours, fuel, and 
food stocks.210 
Nonetheless, a governor’s decision to activate his own National Guard needs to be 
weighed carefully. Although National Guardsmen bring a great deal of capability to bear, 
they can also be some of the governor’s most expensive resources. Although soldier pay 
rates vary, adjutants general often use $150 to $200 as a good daily payroll figure when 
estimating SAD expenses for a single guardsman.211 The per-hour “blade time” on military 
helicopters is even more onerous. 
Additionally, emergency managers and governors must consider some limitations 
to SAD in situations where they have the freedom to choose how to deploy National 
Guardsmen. There are differences between federal status and state active duty that make 
SAD status less appealing than regular duty under 32 U.S.C. §502. These differences are 
included in this appendix because they are useful in explaining the underlying tension and 
doctrinal uncertainty surrounding the use of the Guard for nationally significant disaster 
response. This thesis proposes that doctrine should help the DoD understand how and when 
to engage the Guard in DSCA operations supporting HS activities or in pure HD. The 
disparities between Title 32 and SAD become emotional arguments during Guard 
employment and are often comingled or subsume doctrinal concerns. Although important, 
these disparities can become strawmen arguments that detract from the doctrinal clarity 
this thesis seeks.  
                                                 
210 Lowenberg, Role of the National Guard, 2. 
211 An E5 with six years of service earns $6,368.89, which is approximately $212 per day. “Military 
Pay Calculator,” Federal Pay, accessed March 17, 2019, https://www.federalpay.org/military/calculator. 
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D. FACTORS DIFFERENTIATING SAD FROM FEDERALLY FUNDED 
TITLE 32 STATUS  
1. Healthcare  
Guardsmen without healthcare are not necessarily provided healthcare by virtue of 
activation on state active duty. In fact, their very activation may cause them to lose the 
coverage their regular employers may provide. The only protection afforded them is 
coverage under the state’s workers compensation insurance. Conversely, a guardsman in 
Title 32 status (even while performing normal weekend training duties) can expect a line-
of-duty determination that provides full medical care for any injury incurred as a result of 
performing military duty.212 In addition, full medical benefits are provided for any Title 32 
activation over 30 days.213  
2. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
(USERRA) 
USERRA protects a guardsman from arbitrary retribution from an employer by 
virtue of activation to service. This law provides considerable federal protection to a 
guardsman if activated for service under any provision of § 502 and especially for federal, 
Title 10 service responding to overseas deployments. Although some states have enacted 
comparable USERRA-like protections under state law, others have no USERRA 
protections for SAD activations, exposing guardsmen to potential employer retribution for 
National Guard–induced absenteeism.214  
                                                 
212 The DoD points to this position as a strong argument against employing guardsmen in a 502(f) 
status because of the potential for unlimited medical liability whose cost is passed on to the Veteran’s 
Administration for injuries incurred while accomplishing civil support missions. 
213 “When activated (Called or ordered to active duty service for more than 30 days in a row), 
[guardsmen] are eligible for the same health and dental benefits as active duty service members.” “Plans,” 
Tricare, accessed September 29, 2017, https://tricare.mil/Plans/Eligibility/NGRMandFamilies/Activated. 
214 According to this author, in the 2017 response to Hurricane Maria, state directors of military 
support were told on conference calls that their guardsmen could not deploy because their employers would 
not release them for SAD.  
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3. Compensation 
Each state is free to enact a SAD compensation schedule in line with, or completely 
divorced from, the active-duty military pay scale. Most states have or are enacting 
legislation to ensure SAD compensation mirrors active-duty federal pay tables. Even the 
states whose plans most closely mirror active-duty pay still fall short. Active-duty pay has 
some important federal tax benefits that a state cannot duplicate.215 For a large-scale, multi-
state disaster, there is the real potential that a sergeant working 18-hour days in one state 
could receive greater compensation than an identical sergeant doing the same work just 
one state away. When one considers a disaster in which Title 10 military forces are 
operating side-by-side with state guardsmen in SAD, this disparity and inequity seem all 
the more egregious.  
4. Payroll Administration 
A critically important consideration associated with pay is the administration of 
payroll. The routine federal payroll process of every state National Guard is a well-
understood process, duplicated every month across the country. Thousands of guardsmen 
across the entire country are activated for two days every month, returned to their employer, 
and paid without a hitch. The process is well tried and almost seamless. There are even 
mechanisms in place to track federal payroll costs incurred during disaster response that 
allow rapid and accurate cost accounting at the completion of the mission.216 Conversely, 
the state’s entire SAD pay process has to be replicated and, in some cases, completely 
invented from scratch.217 These sometimes-cumbersome payroll processes mean that SAD 
                                                 
215 Active-duty and 502(f) in this context mean the same thing. Pay tables and the tax treatment of T-10 
or T-32 active duty are the same. Active-duty pay in this context is base pay, the basic allowance for 
housing (BAH), and the basic allowance for subsistence (BAS). BAH and BAS are non-taxable and, 
therefore, represent a tax-advantaged component of overall military compensation. See https://www. 
federalpay.org/military. 
216 “[Disaster relief] costs should be recorded using unique accounting codes in accordance with 
Service regulations and guidance.” Department of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2013, E-
4. 
217 In Arkansas, every SAD Guardsman must be hired as a brand-new state employee, issued a state 
employee identification number, assigned a unique pay rate (because National Guard pay scales do not 
exist in the normal state payroll system), and then entered into the state payroll system. They then have to 
be terminated at the conclusion of duty. 
98 
employees are often off-cycle with normal state pay cycles and have to wait weeks for their 
first SAD paycheck. The payroll administration associated with a catastrophic event would 
greatly exceed the capacity of most state human-resource agencies.  
5. Retirement 
Every day of a guardsman’s service contributes toward a federally defined benefit 
pension. After 20 years of satisfactory service, a guardsman’s points are tabulated and 
applied toward a retirement annuity that endows at age 60. The more points, the better the 
endowment. Although guardsmen in SAD can serve for extended periods, none of this 
state-time contributes points toward their federal retirement annuity.218  
6. Advantages 
Conversely, there are some advantages to SAD. When supporting in-state events 
without national implication, and where no federal disaster declaration exists, states 
typically use SAD authority and state funding. Since the governor is providing the authority 
and funding, these missions can be approved quickly, and there is greater diversity in the 
kind of mission that can be accomplished. Support for law enforcement is one area in which 
this flexibility and speed are especially important. In many states, the National Guard has 
constitutionally provided law enforcement authority while in SAD, states may choose to 
place guardsmen in SAD status when they are supporting state-level law enforcement 
agencies. The Posse Comitatus Act aims to limit direct military involvement in civilian law 
enforcement, absent congressional or constitutional authorization; however, the act (and 
therefore the restriction from support in a law enforcement capacity) does not apply to the 
National Guard in a SAD or Title 32 status.219 
  
                                                 
218 Again, this is an argument from the DoD for not placing guardsmen in 502(f). The permanent 
entitlement created by 502(f) creates a generational cost that significantly outlives the disaster. 
219 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2015); and Rofrano, 2019 Domestic Operations Law and 
Policy, 58–60. 
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APPENDIX B.  DEFINITIONS 
Active Guard and Reserve (AGR): Full-time reserve-component personnel who are an 
exception to the part-time nature of most members of the reserve component. Their primary 
purpose is to provide training and administration for the “drill-status” or part-time 
members. “The term ‘Active Guard and Reserve’ means a member of a reserve component 
who is on active duty pursuant to section 12301(d) of this title or, if a member of the Army 
National Guard or Air National Guard, is on fulltime National Guard duty pursuant to 
section 502(f) of title 32, and who is performing Active Guard and Reserve duty.”220 
 
Active duty: “Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States, including 
active duty or full-time training duty in the Reserve Component.”221 
 
Armed Forces of the United States: “A term used to denote collectively all components 
of the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard (when mobilized under 
Title 10, United States Code, to augment the Navy).”222 
 
Command and control: “The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Also 
called C2.”223 
 
Continental United States: “United States territory, including the adjacent territorial 
waters, located within North America between Canada and Mexico. Also called 
CONUS.”224 
 
Contingency: “A situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, 
terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect United 
States interests.”225 
 
Declaration: “Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency under the Stafford 
Act.”226 
 
                                                 
220 10 U.S.C. § 101(b)(16) (2018). 
221 Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2019), 7, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. 
222 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21. 
223 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 43. 
224 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 51. 
225 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 51. 
226 Zimmerman, FEMA Mission Assignment Policy, 1. 
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Disaster Relief Fund (DRF): “The congressional appropriation and source of funding for 
Stafford Act response and recovery programs.” 227 
 
Dual-status commander (DSC): “A DSC is a commissioned officer of the regular USA 
or USAF or a federally recognized Army National Guard (ARNG) or Air National Guard 
(ANG) officer authorized, pursuant to Title 32, USC, Section 315 or 325, by SecDef, with 
the consent of the applicable governor of a state, to exercise command on behalf of, and 
receive separate orders from, a federal chain of command and exercise command on behalf 
of, and receive separate orders from, a state chain of command.”228 
“A DSC is a military commander who may, in accordance with the law, serve in two 
statuses, Federal and State, simultaneously while performing the duties of those statuses 
separately and distinctly. A commander can be a DSC of only the state he or she is affiliated 
with. In other words, there cannot exist multi-state DSCs as an officer holds commission 
in only one State’s National Guard.”229 
 
Counterterrorism: “Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their 
organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill 
fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. Also called CT.”230 
 
Defense coordinating element (DCE): “Staff and military liaison officers who assist the 
defense coordinating officer in facilitating coordination and support to activated 
emergency support functions.”231 
 
Defense coordinating officer (DCO): “Department of Defense single point of contact for 
domestic emergencies who is assigned to a joint field office to process requirements for 
military support; forward mission assignments through proper channels to the appropriate 
military organizations; and assign military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated emergency 
support functions.”232 
 
Department of the Air Force (DAF): “The executive part of the Department of the Air 
Force at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, Reserve Component, 
installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of 
the Air Force.”233 
 
                                                 
227 Zimmerman, 1. 
228 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2018, D-1. 
229 Rofrano, 2019 Domestic Operations Law and Policy, 56. 
230 Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary, 56. 
231 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 63. 
232 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 63. 
233 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 67. 
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Department of the Army (DA): “The executive part of the Department of the Army at the 
seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, Reserve Component, installations, 
activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of the Army.”234 
 
Department of the Navy (DON): “The executive part of the Department of the Navy at 
the seat of government; the headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating 
forces of the United States Navy and of the United States Marine Corps, including the 
Reserve Component of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, 
installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary of 
the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant 
to law.”235 
 
Domestic emergencies: “Civil defense emergencies, civil disturbances, major disasters, or 
natural disasters affecting the public welfare and occurring within the United States and its 
territories.”236 
 
Emergency support function (ESF): ESFs “provide the structure for coordinating Federal 
interagency support for a Federal response to an incident. They are mechanisms for 
grouping functions most frequently used to provide Federal support to States and Federal-
to-Federal support, both for declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act and 
for non-Stafford Act incidents.”237  
This functional grouping is also present at the state level. State agencies are assigned as 
primary or supporting agencies for a particular state ESF. 
 ESF #1 Transportation 
 ESF #2 Communications 
 ESF #3 Public Works and Engineering 
 ESF #4 Firefighting 
 ESF #5 Information and Planning 
ESF #6 Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human  
Services 
 ESF #7 Logistics 
 ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Services 
 ESF #9 Search and Rescue 
 ESF #10 Oil and Hazardous Materials 
 ESF #11 Agriculture and Natural Resources 
 ESF #12 Energy 
 ESF #13 Public Safety and Security 
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236 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 72. 
237 Zimmerman, FEMA Mission Assignment Policy, 2. 
102 
 ESF #14 [Designation superseded by the National Disaster Recovery 
   Framework] 
 ESF #15 External Affairs/Standard Operating Procedures 
 
Federal military forces: “Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force personnel (including 
Reserve Component personnel) on federal active duty.”238 
 
Federal service: “A term applied to National Guard members and units when called to 
active duty to serve the United States Government under Article I, Section 8 and Article II, 
Section 2 of the Constitution and Title 10, United States Code, Sections 12401 to 
12408.”239 See federalize. 
 
Federalize: “The terms ‘Federal service’ and ‘Federalized’ are applied to National Guard 
members and units when ordered to active duty (serving on active duty under Title 10). 
. . . See 10 U.S.C. chs. 13 and 1211 (2012 & Supp. IV 2017).”240 To “federalize” should 
not be confused with “to federally fund.” Federal service means service to the president 
and implies Title 10 status. Federal funding is implicit when federalized but can also occur 
while still subordinate to a governor’s authority in Title 32 status. 
 
Immediate response authority (IRA): “In response to a Request For Assistance from a 
civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval 
from higher authority, DOD officials, (most typically installation commanders) may 
provide an Immediate Response by temporarily employing the resources under their 
control, subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters, to save 
lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the United States. 
Immediate Response Authority does not permit actions that would subject civilians to the 
use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.”241 
 
Homeland: “In accordance with Department of Defense Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, 
Department of Defense Information Security Program: Protection of Classified 
Information, the homeland is ‘the physical region that includes the continental United 
States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States possessions and territories, and surrounding 
territorial waters and airspace.’ Furthermore, Department of Defense Directive (DODD), 
3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), specifies defense support of civil 
authorities is executed ‘within the United States, including the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, 
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any territory or possession of the 
United States or any political subdivision thereof.’ Additionally, the National Cyber 
                                                 
238 Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary, 87. 
239 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 87. 
240 Martin and Thomas, Domestic Operational Law, 47–48. 
241 Christian Rofrano et al., Domestic Disaster Response 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria: 
Lessons Learned for Judge Advocates (Charlottesville, VA: Center for Law and Military Operations, 2018), 
20. 
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Incident Response Plan; Presidential Policy Directive-41, U.S. Cyber Incident 
Coordination Policy; and Directive Type Memorandum 17-007, Interim Policy and 
Guidance for Defense Support to Cyber Incident Response, includes cyberspace.”242  
 
Homeland defense (HD): “The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, 
domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or 
other threats as directed by the President.”243 
 
Homeland security (HS): “A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within 
the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other 
emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and 
other emergencies that occur.”244 
 
Inactive duty training: “Authorized training performed by a member of a Reserve 
Component not on active duty or active duty for training and consisting of regularly 
scheduled unit training assemblies, additional training assemblies, periods of appropriate 
duty or equivalent training, and any special additional duties authorized for Reserve 
Component personnel by the Secretary concerned, and performed by them in connection 
with the prescribed activities of the organization in which they are assigned with or without 
pay.”245 
 
Joint doctrine: “Fundamental principles that guide the employment of United States 
military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective and may include terms, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures.”246 
 
Lead federal agency (LFA): “The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall 
federal response to an emergency.”247 
 
Major disaster: “Any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high 
water, wind driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, 
mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in 
any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage 
of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under the Stafford 
Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and 
disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused 
thereby (42 U.S.C. § 5122 (2)).”248 
                                                 
242 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 2018, I-2. 
243 Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary, 106. 
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Military department: “One of the departments within the Department of Defense created 
by the National Security Act of 1947, which are the Department of the Army, the 
Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.”249 
Mission assignment (MA): “The vehicle used by the Department of Homeland 
Security/Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal Emergency Management 
Agency to support federal operations in a declared Stafford Act major disaster or 
emergency declaration that orders immediate, short-term emergency response assistance 
when an applicable state or local government is overwhelmed by the event and lacks the 
capability to perform, or contract for, the necessary work.”250 Also, “A work order issued 
by FEMA, with or without reimbursement, that directs another Federal agency to utilize its 
authorities and the resources granted to it under Federal law in support of State, local, tribal, 
and territorial government assistance (42 USC §§ 5170a, 5192; 44 C.F.R. § 206.2(a)(18)).” 
251
National Guard civil support (NGCS): A mission in which the “National Guard normally 
serves in a supporting role to other primary state or federal agencies by providing assistance 
to U.S. civil authorities at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels.” Also, “‘support 
provided by the National Guard of the several states while in State Active Duty status or 
Title 32 duty status to civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law 
enforcement and other activities.’ National Guard Soldiers and Airmen conduct National 
Guard Civil Support missions in their state role.”252 
National Incident Management System (NIMS): “NIMS guides all levels of 
government, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and the private sector to work 
together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from incidents. NIMS 
provides stakeholders across the whole community with the shared vocabulary, systems, 
and processes to successfully deliver the capabilities described in the National 
Preparedness System. NIMS defines operational systems, including the Incident Command 
System (ICS), Emergency Operations Center (EOC) structures, and Multiagency 
Coordination Groups (MAC Groups) that guide how personnel work together during 
incidents. NIMS applies to all incidents, from traffic accidents to major disasters.”253 
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC): “FEMA’s primary operations 
management center, and focal point for national resource coordination. The NRCC 
249 Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary, 152. 
250 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 155. 
251 Zimmerman, FEMA Mission Assignment Policy, 2. 
252 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Domestic Operations, 5. 
253 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 1, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/ 
1508151197225-ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_NIMS_2017.pdf. 
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monitors potential or developing incidents, and supports the efforts of regional and field 
components.” 254 
 
National Response Framework (NRF): The NRF describes how the U.S. responds to 
disasters. At its core, the NRF proposes that response must be scalable, flexible, and 
adaptable. The NRF entreats all levels of government to engage in a partnership predicated 
on a bottom-up, tiered response wherein the unity of effort and readiness to act are assured 
by handled response “at the lowest jurisdictional level capable of handling the mission.”255 
 
National security: “A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign 
relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining: a. A military or defense 
advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. A favorable foreign relations 
position; or c. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive 
action from within or without, overt or covert.”256 
 
National special security event (NSSE): 32 C.F.R. § 183.3 defines an NSSE as “An event 
of national significance as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. These 
national or international events, occurrences, contests, activities, or meetings, which, by 
virtue of their profile or status, represent a significant target, and therefore warrant 
additional preparation, planning, and mitigation efforts. The USSS, FBI, and FEMA are 
the federal agencies with lead responsibilities for NSSEs; other federal agencies, including 
DoD, may provide support to the NSSE if authorized by law.”257 
 
Pre-scripted mission assignment (PSMA): “A preliminary statement of work and cost 
estimate developed prior to an incident by FEMA and [another federal agency].”258 
 
Ready Reserve: “The Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve liable for active 
duty as prescribed by law (Title 10, United States Code, Sections 10142, 12301, and 
12302).”259 
 
Reserve Component: “The Armed Forces of the United States Reserve Component 
consists of the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy 
Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air 
Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve.”260 The Reserve Component is an 
overarching phrase that refers to all members of the Title 10 reserve force and the Title 32 
Army and Air Force National Guards. They are grouped together under the “reserve 
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component” umbrella to differentiate their part-time status as opposed to the full-time, 
standing military force. Despite their part-time nature, the Title 10 reserves and the 
National Guard are distinct and operate under completely separate jurisdictional and legal 
authorities. The National Guard and the reserves are respectively referred to as COMPO-2 
and COMPO-3 (the active duty is COMOP-1).  
 
Service: “A branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, established by act of 
Congress, which are: the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard.”261 
 
United States Armed Forces: “Used to denote collectively the Army, Marine Corps, 
Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard. See also Armed Forces of the United States.”262 
 
Unity of effort: “Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the 
participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the 
product of successful unified action.”263 
                                                 
261 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 213. 
262 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 244. 
263 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 246. 
107 
APPENDIX C.  DOD AND NATIONAL GUARD DOCTRINE, 
INSTRUCTIONS, AND DIRECTIVES 
Department of Defense. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. DoD Directive 3025.18. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018. 
———. Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard. DoD Directive 
3160.01. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017.  
———. Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force. DoD Directive 
1200.17. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008. https://www.hsdl.org/ 
?view&did=233708 
———. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 
Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, February 2013.  
———. The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities. DoD 
Instruction 3025.22. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Civil Support. Joint Publication 3-28. Washington, DC: Department 
of Defense, 2007. 
———. Counterterrorism. Joint Publication 3-26. Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2009. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=31130. 
———. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Joint Publication 3-28. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2013. 
———. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Joint Publication 3-28. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2018.  
———. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. Joint Publication 1. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017. 
———. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2019.  
———. Homeland Defense. Joint Publication 3-27. Washington, DC: United States Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2013. 
———. Homeland Security. Joint Publication 3-26. Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2005. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456038. 
———. Joint Operations. Joint Publication 3-0. Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2018.  
108 
National Guard Bureau. National Guard Domestic Operations. National Guard 
Regulation 500-1/ANGI 10-8101. Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2008.  
Secretary of the Air Force. Appropriation Symbols and Budget Codes (Fiscal Year 2013). 
AF Manual 65-604. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012.  
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Financial Management Regulation. Vol. 1–
16. DoD 7000.14-R. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017.  
109 
APPENDIX D.  THE DEFENSE EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND 
(DERF) 
Funding of the National Guard in accomplishing DSCA is a recurrent challenge in 
this thesis. A fund like DERF could ease the fiscal challenges of Guard activation by 
providing a funding mechanism for the DoD in HS and DSCA missions. It could even 
serve as a resource for HD disaster funding when unanticipated HD expenses place 
pressure on the DoD budget. The timeline below provides some insight into DERF as it 
was initially conceived.  
1990: “Public Law 101–165 establishe[s] DERF to reimburse DoD Components 
for the use of their resources in providing disaster assistance. According to DoD 
regulations, DERF [is] intended to reimburse DoD Components providing disaster and 
emergency relief assistance only after the Components have first used their own 
resources.”264 On April 20, 1992, a memorandum from the under secretary of defense, 
comptroller (USD[C]), establishes the Disaster Relief Funds in DoD instructions.  
1996: DoD financial management regulations outline procedures for the DoD to 
receive reimbursement from FEMA using DERF, not only to assist the DoD with funds 
beyond those available within its own service budgets but also to receive reimbursements.  
2003: In the wake of 9/11, Congress uses the DERF as a means to dramatically 
increase the funds available to the DoD for prosecuting the war on terror. From 2001 to 
2003, $38 billion in emergency or supplemental appropriations are added to DERF with 
the intent of allowing the DoD flexibility in prosecuting the war on terror.265 Deviating 
from the original intent of Congress to provide funding for disaster response, the 2001–
2003 funds are allocated across 10 budget areas with ambiguously broad terms like 
“increased situational awareness,” “initial crisis response,” and “improved command and 
                                                 
264 Patricia Marsh et al., Defense Emergency Response Fund, D-2008-105 (Arlington, VA: Department 
of Defense Inspector General, June 20, 2008), 9, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=487067. 
265 Government Accountability Office, Defense Budget. 
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control.”266 Notably, these categories do not align with the regular DoD appropriations 
account structure, which resulted in the inability to accurately account for fund 
allocation.267  
November 2003: In an effort to make DERF less accessible to DoD comptrollers, 
the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003 is amended, so 
outstanding expenses chargeable to DERF “shall be charged to any current appropriations 
account of the Department of Defense available for the same purpose.”268 
June 2008: A DoD Inspector General (IG) audit indicates DERF has not been used 
correctly. The IG report affirms the account’s purpose: “to provide disaster relief assistance 
without depleting the funds [DoD] needs to accomplish its mission.”269 The report laments 
that DERF budget managers had not anticipated increased DoD involvement in disaster 
relief efforts and had failed to fund it adequately.270 The fund has provisions allowing for 
up to $50 million in foreign disaster assistance.271 The report finds this provision 
problematic, insisting that the funds focus on domestic civil emergency assistance, with 
overseas assistance as a last resort.272 
This thesis shares the IG’s recommendation that the assistant secretary of defense 
for homeland defense and America’s security affairs instruct its budget officers to secure 
annual funding to sustain DERF.273 
July 2010: The Government Accountability Office completes a report on the DoD’s 
general financial management. Referencing the DoD’s 2008 IG report, the Government 
                                                 
266 Government Accountability Office, 8. 
267 Government Accountability Office, 10. 
268 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Pub. L. No. 108–106 § 1105 (2003), https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-
bill/3289/text.  
269 Marsh et al., Defense Emergency Response Fund, 1. 
270 Marsh et al., 4. 
271 Marsh et al., 15. 
272 Marsh et al., 13. 
273 Marsh et al., 15. 
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Accountability Office cites Army mismanagement of $110 million in DERF funding.274 
The report also reaffirms the purpose of the fund: to “allow DOD to provide disaster and 
emergency relief assistance without depleting the funds it needs to accomplish its 
mission.”275 
October 2012: Air Force financial management guidance describes DERF as a 
fund that enables DSCA, but which has been “dormant since [the] 9-11-01 Terrorist 
Attack.”276 
January 2014: The secretary of defense’s deputy comptroller cancels DERF. 
Instead of acknowledging the internal mismanagement of the fund for excessive overseas 
use (as cited in the IG’s report), the comptroller uses this precedent as a reason to 
discontinue the fund.277 The comptroller goes on to state that the DoD has never been in a 
situation where a lack of funds has hindered its ability to respond to domestic requests for 
assistance. Without regard of the legal barrier that explicitly forbids reimbursement of 
federally funded Guard action in the homeland, the comptroller inaccurately argues DERF 
is unnecessary because FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund already creates a mechanism to 
reimburse DoD response to presidentially declared actions under the Stafford Act.278 
2015: One of the most useful guides for military lawyers operating in the homeland, 
the Domestic Operational Law Handbook for Judge Advocates, retains a reference to 
                                                 
274 Government Accountability Office, DoD Financial Management: Actions under Way Need to Be 
Successfully Completed to Address Long-Standing Funds Control Weaknesses, GAO-14-94 (Washington, 
DC: Government Accountability Office, April 2014), 15, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a601257. 
pdf. 
275 Patricia Marsh, Management of Emergency Supplemental Appropriations at Selected Department of 
the Army Commands in Response to the Terrorist Attacks, D-2010-072 (Arlington, VA: Department of 
Defense Inspector General, July 12, 2010), 1, https://media.defense.gov/2010/Jul/12/2001712485/-1/-
1/1/10-072.pdf. 
276 Secretary of the Air Force, Appropriation Symbols and Budget Codes (Fiscal Year 2013), AF 
Manual 65-604 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 163–64, https://www.acq.osd.mil/ 
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DERF “to keep judge advocates that may have relied on this funding mechanism in the 
past informed of the change.”279 By 2018, there is no reference to DERF in the 
handbooks.280  
2017: In the 2017 version of the DoD’s Financial Management Regulation, chapter 
6 has been archived, and references to what was formerly the Disaster Relief Fund have 
been moved to chapter 23 and transformed into an overseas contingency operations 
regulation tied to foreign disaster relief—a move that seems like an effort to justify the 
DoD budget mismanagement identified in the 2008 IG report. The financial management 
regulation specifically rescinds the under secretary of defense’s (comptroller) 1992 
memorandum that established the Disaster Relief Funds.281 
2018: Despite rescinding the fund, the president’s FY2019 budget still includes $11 
million for “emergency response,” implying that the fund is still available and could be 
funded to a level that would enable federally funded Guard action when appropriate.282 
                                                 
279 Blackmore and Fields, Domestic Operational Law, 221. 
280 Martin and Thomas, Domestic Operational Law. 
281 Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Financial Management Regulation, vol. 1–16, DoD 
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APPENDIX E.  DOD’S MISSION ASSIGNMENT PROCESS 
 
Figure 10. DoD’s Mission Assignment Process 
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